Antigenic and Genetic Evolution of Emerging Avian Origin Influenza A Viruses by Xu, Yifei
Mississippi State University 
Scholars Junction 
Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
12-9-2016 
Antigenic and Genetic Evolution of Emerging Avian Origin 
Influenza A Viruses 
Yifei Xu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td 
Recommended Citation 
Xu, Yifei, "Antigenic and Genetic Evolution of Emerging Avian Origin Influenza A Viruses" (2016). Theses 
and Dissertations. 690. 
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/690 
This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at 
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com. 
Template A v3.0 (beta): Created by J. Nail 06/2015  





Submitted to the Faculty of 
Mississippi State University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in Veterinary Medical Sciences 
in the College of Veterinary Medicine 




















(Committee Member/Graduate Coordinator) 
 ____________________________________ 
Andy D. Perkins 
(Committee Member) 
 ____________________________________ 
Federico G. Hoffmann 
(Committee Member) 
 ____________________________________ 
Nan (Alan) Zhao 
(Committee Member) 
 ____________________________________ 
Kent H. Hoblet 
Dean 
College of Veterinary Medicine 
 
 
Name: Yifei Xu 
ABSTRACT 
Date of Degree: December 9, 2016 
Institution: Mississippi State University 
Major Field: Veterinary Medical Sciences 
Major Professor: Dr. Xiu-Feng (Henry) Wan 
Title of Study: Antigenic and genetic evolution of emerging avian origin influenza A 
viruses 
Pages in Study 174 
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Periodic introductions of influenza A viruses (IAVs) from wild birds contribute to 
emergence of novel strains that infect domestic poultry, lower mammals, and humans, 
but the mechanisms of emergence are unclear. The objectives of this dissertation research 
are to infer the genesis of two emerging IAVs, low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) 
H10N8 and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H7N8 viruses, and to characterize 
the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of contemporary H7 avian influenza viruses 
(AIVs) from North America.  
First, AIVs that are genetically close to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered 
at the live poultry market (LPM) visited by the first H10N8 patient. High seroprevalence 
of H10 virus was observed in ducks and chickens from five LPMs in the region. These 
findings suggested that LPM was the most probable source of human infection with the 
H10N8 virus, and this virus appeared to be present throughout the LPM system in the 
city.  
Second, the novel H7N8 virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the 
Mississippi flyway during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana 
 
 
turkey, in which it evolved from LPAI into HPAI. H4N8 IAVs from diving ducks possess 
a gene constellation comprising five H7N8–like gene segments. These findings suggest 
that viral gene constellations circulating among diving ducks could contribute towards 
the emergence of IAVs that can affect poultry. Diving ducks may serve as a unique 
reservoir, contributing to the maintenance, diversification, and transmission of IAVs in 
wild birds. 
Third, antigenic and genetic characterization of 93 H7 AIVs from North America 
showed limited antigenic diversity. Gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid 
substitutions in the H7 gene of AIVs from wild and domestic birds caused a wide genetic 
diversity. These findings suggested that continuous genetic evolution has not led to 
significant antigenic diversity for contemporary H7 AIVs isolated from wild and 
domestic birds in North America. 
In summary, these findings not only improve our understanding of the ecology 
and evolution of IAVs but also provide information for formulation of effective disease 
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The Biology of Influenza A Virus 
Emerging infectious diseases can be defined as “infections that have newly 
appeared in a population or have existed previously but are rapidly increasing in 
incidence or geographic range” (1). Among many infectious agents, few have as 
profound effect on humans as influenza viruses (2). 
Influenza viruses belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family and are enveloped, 
single-stranded, negative sense RNA viruses containing seven to eight gene segments (3, 
4). Influenza viruses are categorized into four distinct serotypes, A, B, C, and D on the 
basis of antigenic difference in the nucleoprotein (NP) and matrix (M1) protein (5). 
Among them, serotype A is the most important one due to its wide host range (4). 
Serotype B, C, and D are reported to infect only mammals (6-8). 
The genome of influenza A virus (IAV) comprises eight RNA gene segments 
(segment one to eight) with varying lengths of 890–2,341 nucleotides. These gene 
segments encode at least 11 proteins: polymerase basic 2 (PB2), polymerase basic 1 
(PB1) and polymerase basic 1 - Frame 2 (PB1-F2), polymerase acidic (PA), 
hemagglutinin (HA), NP, neuraminidase (NA), matrix (M) 1 and 2, and nonstructural 
(NS) 1 and 2 proteins are encoded by gene segments one to eight, respectively. IAV 
contains a host cell-derived lipid membrane, which is embedded with three virus proteins, 
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HA, NA, and M2. An inner coat comprised of the M1 protein is found underlying the 
membrane. Nucleocapsid of the viral genome lies at the center of the virus. Each of eight 
gene segments is encapsidated by multiple NP proteins to form a nucleocapsid, while 
three polymerase proteins (PB2, PB1, and PA) sit at the end of the nucleocapsid (4, 9, 
10). IAVs could be further divided into distinct subtypes on the basis of the antigenicity 
of two surface glycoproteins, HA and NA. To date, 18 HA and 11 NA subtypes have 
been reported (11). 
Impacts of Influenza Disease Caused by IAVs 
IAVs present a typical one-health challenge, where human health and animal 
health meet and influence each other (4). IAVs infecting humans could cause both global 
pandemic and seasonal epidemic. The occasional influenza pandemic could infect 20% to 
40% of the world population and cause a significant number of deaths (12). For example, 
the 1918 influenza pandemic was considered one of the most devastating infectious 
diseases in human history and it was estimated to have claimed at least 50 million human 
lives around the world (13, 14). In addition to sporadic pandemic outbreaks, the seasonal 
epidemic causes a number of morbidity and mortality in humans worldwide annually, 
including an average of more than 200,000 hospitalizations and 23,000 deaths in the 
United States alone (15, 16). The direct medical cost associated with seasonal influenza 
in the United States averages over ten billion US dollars annually (17). 
The diseases caused by IAV infection among domestic poultry include 
asymptomatic infections, mild to severe respiratory disease, and severe disease with high 
morbidity and mortality. On the basis of virulence in chicken, avian influenza viruses 
(AIVs) could be divided into two groups: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and 
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low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). HPAI could cause devastating disease among 
domestic poultry and the mortality may be as high as 100%. HPAI viruses are associated 
with direct and indirect losses that may be incurred by the poultry industry through 
mortality of affected birds, culling of flocks to prevent spread, trade restrictions imposed 
of detection, and increased costs associated with outbreak response. For example, 17 
HPAI outbreaks were reported among domestic poultry worldwide during 1955-2000, 
including six outbreaks among domestic turkey and 11 outbreaks among domestic 
chicken (18). Among them, seven outbreaks caused more than 100,000 birds affection or 
depopulation. In 2003, 255 poultry flocks in the Netherlands was affected by HPAI 
H7N7 virus and it has led to the death or culling of more than 30 million birds (19). The 
HPAI outbreak among domestic poultry caused by H5 AIVs in the northwestern and mid-
western United States in 2015 led to depopulation of more than 48 million birds 
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_health/2015/fs-hpai-vaccine-use.pdf). 
AIV, such as the HPAI H5N1 virus, could also transmit from birds to humans and 
cause fatal disease. In spring of 1996, the precursor of currently circulating HPAI H5N1 
viruses was identified in farmed geese in Guangdong, China; the mortality caused by the 
virus among geese was about 40%. Outbreaks among chicken were detected in Hong 
Kong one year later and led to depopulation of about 1.5 million birds. The first case of 
human infection with the H5N1 virus was reported in May 1997; H5N1 virus strain was 
isolated from a boy died of respiratory illness in Hong Kong (20). 17 additional cases of 
human infection with H5N1 viruses were reported in Hong Kong in November and 
December of the same year and five cases were fatal. In March 1999, H5N1 viruses were 
isolated from environmental samples collected from cages that housed geese in Hong 
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Kong (21). In 2003, fatal human infections with H5N1 virus were reported for the first 
time after the outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 (22). Since December 2003, HPAI H5N1 
virus has caused outbreaks among domestic poultry and repeated zoonotic transmissions 
in Asia (23-26). In May 2005, HPAI H5N1 virus were detected among migratory birds at 
Qinghai Lake, China (27) and were subsequently found to spread to Europe, the Middle 
East, and Africa (28, 29). To date, the HPAI H5N1 virus has cause more than 800 
laboratory-confirmed human cases worldwide, including over 400 deaths 
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archive
s/en/).  
Ecology of IAVs 
IAVs exist in a complex ecosystem that involves various hosts, including humans, 
swine, equine, canine, sea mammals, and numerous wild and domestic birds (4, 9, 30).   
Wild Birds 
The first isolation of IAV from wild bird was reported in 1961 (31). A HPAI 
strain, A/tern/South Africa/61(H5N3), was isolated from a common tern in South Africa; 
and this virus caused infection among 1,300 common terns (18, 31). LPAI strains have 
been isolated from wild waterfowl since the mid-1970s (30-32). World-wide, LPAI 
viruses have been recovered from at least 105 wild bird species representing 26 different 
taxonomic families (33). Most of the 26 families are in the Order Anseriformes, followed 
by the Order Charadriiformes; birds in these two orders include ducks, geese, and swans, 
and shorebirds, gulls, and terns, respectively, which are considered major natural 
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reservoirs for IAVs (4, 33, 34). IAVs representing 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been 
identified in wild birds throughout the world (33). 
In North America, the southern migration of birds begins as early as August for 
some species, and in later September, October, and early November for most species. The 
highest prevalence of IAVs is found in dabbling ducks, particular mallards, which have 
been the most extensively studied bird species in the ecosystem of IAVs (33). The 
prevalence of IAVs in mallards fluctuates during the bird migration cycle. Influenza 
prevalence could reach as high as 60% among the mallards sampled in the breeding areas 
in Canada prior to the migration in early fall (35). Influenza prevalence falls to less than 
2% by the time when mallards reach the wintering ground in lower Mississippi and 
Louisiana usually around December and January of the following year. Influenza virus 
were brought back by mallards to the breeding areas in Canada in spring, although the 
prevalence may fall to as low as 0.25% (4).  
The infectious pattern of IAVs in shorebirds and gulls is different from that in 
waterfowl in the following two major aspects. First, the highest prevalence of IAVs in 
shorebirds and gulls is usually found in the later spring and early summer (4, 36). 
Shorebirds and gulls are proposed to bring the virus back to the northern breeding area 
(36). Thus, shorebirds and gulls may contribute to the overwinter maintenance and long-
term persistence of IAVs in wild birds. Second, in addition to H1 to H12, IAVs of the 
subtype H13 and H16 were primarily isolated from shorebirds and gulls (33, 37, 38). 
Substantial difference was observed between the genomic sequences of the H13 and H16 
gene segments and those of other subtypes, suggest the long time isolation of IAVs of 
these two HA subtypes in shorebirds and gulls (37). 
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The infection caused by most IAV strains in wild birds is asymptomatic, which 
may due to the long-term adaptation of IAVs in these birds (4). In wild birds, IAVs 
replicate mainly in the intestinal tract and are excreted in high level in the feces (39, 40). 
For example, a study in 1978 showed that the load of influenza virus in the feces of 
mallards could be up to 108.7 50% egg infectious doses per gram (40). In addition, 
influenza virus could remain infectious for over 30 days in water at 0 degree Celsius (oC) 
and four days at 22 oC (40, 41). Wild waterfowl shed virus into the water through feces 
and fecal-oral route is considered the major way for the transmission of IAVs between 
waterfowls (4, 9). 
The genetic pool of IAVs is divided into two major independently evolving 
lineages, Eurasian and American, probably due to geographical separation of host species 
(42-44). The migration of birds between different continents allows the occasional gene 
flow between these two genetic pools (45). For example, Beringian Crucible is 
recognized as a common breeding grounds shared by migratory birds from Eurasia and 
America. Early research showed that around 1.5 to 2.9 million birds migrate from Asia to 
Alaska annually (46). A 2008 study characterized 38 IAVs isolated from Alaska and 
found that nearly half (44.7%) possess at least one gene segment more closely related to 
those recovered from Eurasia instead of those from North America (47). Evidence for 
intercontinental gene flow was also observed in another study of 25 IAVs isolated from 
North America, among them, five isolates have two Eurasian origin gene segments and 
20 isolates have one Eurasian origin gene segment (48). In addition, there were evidences 
showing that Eurasian origin H6 IAVs invaded the North American wild bird population 




Through migration, wild birds can carry IAVs from one area to another and 
present risks to the host species along the migratory flyway, including domestic poultry, 
lower mammals, and humans. Frequent introductions of wild bird-origin IAVs to 
domestic poultry have been well-documented. In Minnesota alone during 1978-2000, 
there were at least 108 laboratory-confirmed introductions of influenza viruses from wild 
birds to domestic poultry (51). The direct transmission of IAVs from migratory birds to 
range-reared turkey was recognized as a major source of IAV outbreaks among domestic 
turkey in the United States; and this dynamic was also suggested to contribute to the IAV 
outbreaks among chickens (52). Alternatively, range-reared domestic ducks and geese 
could serve as intermediate hosts that bridge the ecological gap between wild birds and 
domestic chickens and turkeys.  
Following introduction to domestic poultry, IAVs could cause disease and 
circulate in domestic poultry for a long time (30, 53); and AIVs of two HA subtypes, H5 
and H7, are known to could give rise to HPAI virus. HPAI virus was historically known 
as fowl plague, which was reported for the first time among chickens in Italy in 1878 (18, 
54). The virus was later isolated in 1902, A/Chicken/Brescia/1902(H7N7). Fowl plague 
was classified as IAV in 1955 and referred to HPAI ever since (18). The major difference 
in the pathogenicity of HPAI and LPAI viruses is their ability to cause systemic 
replication in the host. The cleavability of the HA protein is one of the major 
determinants of the tissue tropism of AIVs (55). The HA protein of HPAI virus can be 
cleaved by a broad range of enzymes that present in most cells of the body and caused 
systemic infection. In contrast, the HA protein of LPAI virus can only be cleaved by 
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trypsin-like proteases and infection is restricted in the respiratory or intestinal tract (56). 
The presence of multiple basic amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein is 
the major molecular feature for HPAI strains. 
Seventeen HPAI outbreaks were reported among domestic poultry worldwide 
during 1955-2000 (18). HPAI outbreaks among domestic poultry were also reported in 
multiple countries after the year 2000. For example, during 2003-2008, HPAI H5N1 
virus was reported in at least ten countries in East and Southeast Asia, including China, 
Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Vietnam (57). Outside of the region, HPAI H5N1 virus were reported in multiple 
countries in Middle East, Europe, and Africa, including Israel, Iraq, Russia, United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Egypt, and Nigeria (58, 59). Detection of HPAI H7 viruses 
were reported in Chile (H7N3, 2002) (60), the Netherlands (H7N7, 2003) (19), Canada 
(H7N3, 2004 and 2007) (61, 62), and Mexico (H7N3, 2012) (63, 64).  
In January 2014, a novel Eurasian lineage clade 2.3.4.4 HPAI H5N8 virus was 
detected in wild bird and domestic poultry in South Korea (65), and was subsequently 
detected in China and Japan (66). Since November 2014, the novel HPAI H5N8 virus has 
been detected in wild bird and domestic poultry in multiple countries in Europe, 
including Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy, 
(http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/update-on-avian-influenza/2014/). In 
December 2014, HPAI H5N8 virus was first detected in wild bird in the United States 
(67). Two novel reassortant viruses of the subtype H5N1 and H5N2 have been isolated 
from wild bird and domestic poultry in the United States and Canada since December 
2014 (68-71). The HPAI H5 outbreaks caused depopulation of approximately 7.5 million 
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The infection of influenza virus in swine was first clinically recognized in 1918 in 
the United States, which overlaps the time period of the 1918 influenza pandemic (72). 
The first swine influenza virus (SIV) was isolated in 1930 (73, 74); this virus, refers to 
the classical swine H1N1 virus, has continued to circulate and cause diseases in swine 
population worldwide. The classical swine H1N1 virus was found to be predominant in 
the North American swine population until the mid-1990s (75-77); however, this trend 
changed dramatically with the emergence and establishment of the triple reassortant SIVs 
of the subtypes H1N2 and H3N2 since 1998 (78-80). The eight gene segments of the 
triple reassortant SIVs were derived from multiple sources, including the classical swine 
H1N1, human H3N2, and avian origin IAVs (78, 79). In addition, introduction of AIVs to 
swine population has been frequently reported. For example, an avian like H1N1 IAVs 
emerged and led to enzootic disease in the European swine population since 1979 (81-
83). In China, serological surveillance results suggested the prevalence of avian origin 
H3, H4 and H6 IAVs in the swine population (84). Introduction of avian origin H1N1 
IAV to swine was reported in Hong Kong in 1993 (85). There were also reported 
sporadic cases of avian origin IAVs infection in swine, including H4N1 (86), H4N8 (87), 
H5N1 (88), H6N6 (89, 90), H9N2 (91), and H10N5 viruses (92). 
Swine are suggested to play an important role in the ecology of IAVs. The cell of 
swine respiratory tract possesses receptors recognized by both avian (sialic acid α2,3 
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galactose, SA2,3Gal) and human (SA2,6Gal) IAVs (93), and this provides the biological 
basis for the susceptibility of swine to both avian and human IAVs. Thus, swine is 
proposed to function as the intermediate hosts, or mixing vessels, for the generation of 
pandemic strains, including both the 1957 and 1968 pandemic virus (94). The emergence 
of the 2009 pandemic virus provided further evidence supporting this hypothesis (95); 
and this virus will be described in the next section. 
Humans 
The introduction of avian origin influenza gene(s) to influenza viruses that 
circulating in humans has been associated with the emergence of four documented 
pandemic strains, including 1918 H1N1, 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009 H1N1 
viruses (95-98).  
The 1918 influenza pandemic emerged and swept globally since September, 1918 
(13, 99). The origin of the 1918 H1N1 virus remained controversial and probably could 
never be resolved (12, 100). Although no virus was isolated prior or during the 1918 
influenza pandemic, genetic analysis of the reconstructed genome of 1918 H1N1 virus in 
the 1990s showed that the virus was probably an avian like influenza virus (101). There 
are still a few key questions not answered, including the origin host of the virus and the 
potential existence of an intermediate host (12, 13). In contrast to the HPAI viruses, 
multiple basic amino acids were not observed at the cleavage site of the HA protein of the 
1918 H1N1 virus (102, 103). 
The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic strains were both originated from 
southeastern Asia. These two pandemic strains were reassortants generated through 
reassortment between pre-existing human IAVs and AIVs (96-98). The PB1, HA, and 
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NA gene segments of the 1957 H2N2 virus were derived from an AIV, and the remaining 
five gene segments were the descendant of the 1918 H1N1 strain (97). The 1968 H3N2 
virus possess two gene segments (PB1 and HA) originated from an AIV, and the 
remaining six gene segments were derived from the circulating human H2N2 virus (96). 
The first influenza pandemic in the 21th century occurred in 2009. A novel human 
H1N1 virus was first detected in Mexico in March 2009 (104, 105) and this virus quickly 
spread to the rest of the world. By July 2009, 162,300 laboratory-confirmed cases and 
over 1,100 human deaths caused by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were reported in 168 
countries (106). The pandemic was estimated to have caused more than 123,000 deaths 
around the world by the end of 2009 (107). Subsequently, the 2009 H1N1 virus started to 
co-circulate with seasonal H3N2 and influenza B virus around the world (108-110). 
Phylogenetic analysis results showed that the 2009 H1N1 virus was a reassortant with the 
eight gene segments originated from multiple sources (95). The NA and MP gene 
segments were derived from the European avian like H1N1 SIV, and the remaining six 
gene segments were originated from the North American triple reassortant SIV; 
specifically, the HA, NP, and NS gene segments were derived from the classical swine 
H1N1 virus, PB1 gene segment was originated from seasonal H3N2 virus, and PB2 and 
PA gene segments were derived from AIVs (111, 112). Each precursor gene segment of 
the 2009 H1N1 virus had been circulated in the swine population for more than a decade 
and the direct precursor of the virus may had emerged a few months prior to the detection 
of the outbreak in humans (112, 113).  
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Evolution of IAVs 
IAVs are notorious for their capability of rapid evolution in response to the 
adapting hosts. The evolutionary dynamics of IAVs is largely determined by rapid 
mutation, frequent reassortment, and multiple selection pressures, including host immune 
response and host switch (4). 
Population and Quasispecies 
Infection of IAV could start with a small number of virions and then generated a 
large number of progeny viruses. An individually-infected cell could release more than 
104 influenza viruses, although this number is subjected to variation due to difference in 
host cells (114). This large number of influenza viruses exists as a quasispecies, similar to 
other RNA viruses (115). Quasispecies is defined as “a cloud of diverse variants that are 
genetically linked through mutation, interact cooperatively on a functional level, and 
collectively contribute to the characteristics of the population” (116). Selection pressure 
acts upon this whole unit rather than individual virus. In addition, the survival of a 
population is not only determined by its own fitness but also its flexibility to mutate and 
give rise to progenies that are more fit on average. 
Evolutionary Mechanisms 
There are three mechanisms that contribute to the evolution and genetic diversity 
of IAVs: mutation, reassortment, and recombination. 
Mutation refers to substitution, insertion, and deletion due to the intrinsic error of 
the replication. Viral RNA polymerase lacks the proofreading ability and leads to the 
error-prone replication of RNA viruses. The mutation rate of RNA viruses is 
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approximately 10-4 mutations per nucleotide copied (117), which is significantly higher 
than that of DNA viruses (10-9 mutations per nucleotide copied). Based on this mutation 
rate, approximately one mutation is made across the IAV genome during one replication 
cycle. Given the large population size, mutation contributes to the great genetic diversity 
of IAVs. 
The segmented nature of IAV genome allows exchange of individual gene 
segment or combination of gene segments between IAVs during mixed infection in the 
same host cell. Reassortment occurs frequently between IAVs and permits rapid 
generation of progeny viruses with gene segment combination significantly different 
from that of the parental viruses (48, 118, 119). Reassortment enhances the genetic 
diversity of IAV, in turn, this increased diversity may facilitate the generation of novel 
pandemic and epidemic strains. Reassortment has been associated with the emergence of 
at least three out of four documented pandemic strains as described earlier, including 
1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009 H1N1 viruses (95, 96). Moreover, genome-scale 
evolutionary study showed high degree of reassortment and periodic genome-wide 
sweeps for the H3N2 seasonal influenza virus (120, 121). 
Recombination refers to the exchange of pieces of genetic information between 
RNA molecules during replication and leads to the production of a RNA molecule with 
mixed ancestry. Recombination that occurs between regions with high sequence identity 
is referred as homologous, while recombination between two genetically different regions 
or non-related RNA molecules is referred as non-homologous. Early study with genomic 
dataset of human IAV showed that homologous recombination, if occurring at all, is very 
rare (122). On the other hand, non-homologous recombination has been reported and 
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associated with increased pathogenicity of a few AIV strains. The HA gene segment of 
the HPAI H7N3 viruses isolated during the outbreak in Chile (2002) and Canada (2004) 
obtained multi-basic amino acids at the cleavage region through non-homologous 
recombination with NP (60) and MP (123) gene segment, respectively. In addition, HPAI 
H7N3 virus isolated during the outbreak in Mexico (2012) obtained insert at the HA 
cleavage region through non-homologous recombination with host genomes (63). 
Selection Pressure 
Mutation, reassortment, and recombination lead to great genetic diversity of 
IAVs. This increased genetic diversity provides a platform for selection pressure to select 
for or against. 
Immune Pressure 
Although multiple selection pressures were suggested to determine the long-term 
success of any lineage of IAV, host immune pressure is considered to play a critical role. 
IAVs could escape the host immune response through its antigenic evolution known as 
antigenic drift and antigenic shift. Two surface glycoproteins, HA and NA, are the 
primary targets of the humoral immune response. Accumulation of point mutations 
within antibody-binding sites in HA and/or NA proteins can lead to a small antigenic 
change, so called antigenic drift. The switch of HA and/or NA gene segment by 
reassortment can cause a large antigenic change, so called antigenic shift. 
In wild birds, IAVs are proposed to have reached evolutionary stasis and 
maintained a stable antigenic status (4). For example, a study in 1987 showed that H3 
AIVs isolated from mallards within the Pacific flyway during 1977-1985 are highly 
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conserved in antigenic properties (124). Similar to that, a limited antigenic diversity was 
found among 37 H3 AIV strains isolated from migratory birds from Atlantic, Central, 
Mississippi, and Pacific flyways during 2007-2011 (125). Another study found that 
antigenic difference among 26 H7 AIVs isolated from shorebirds and gulls at Delaware 
Bay was within 2-fold change in the hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays; among the 
26 isolates, 24 are of the subtype H7N3, one of subtype H7N4 and one of subtype H7N5 
(38). The same study also observed that four mallard-origin H5 AIVs isolated from 
Sweden and the Netherlands in 1999 and 2002 showed antigenic differences of less than 
4-fold change in HI assays.  
Probably due to the selection pressure from host immune response and/or host 
adaptation, the HA protein of IAVs were found to evolve faster in a few species, inducing 
humans (126), swine (127), and domestic poultry (128, 129). In humans, there are two 
subtypes of seasonal IAVs, H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. Seasonal H3N2 IAV originated 
from the 1968 pandemic strain and has continued to circulate ever since. Seasonal H3N2 
IAV has undergone considerable antigenic evolution and 11 distinct antigenic clusters 
were observed during 1968-2003 (130). Antigenic drift between different clusters could 
be caused by single and multiple amino acid substitutions in the HA protein; and 39 
antigenicity associated sites were identified (131). The history of seasonal H1N1 IAV 
could date back to the 1918 pandemic and it had circulated among humans until replaced 
by H2N2 virus in 1957 (96, 132, 133). During the post-pandemic period, a major 
antigenic change was reported in 1947 (134). After 20 years of being undetected, H1N1 
virus which is identical to that from the 1950s re-emerged in 1977 (135, 136) and has 
been co-circulating with H3N2 virus ever since. Compared to the rapid evolution 
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demonstrated by seasonal H3N2 IAV, H1N1 virus showed less frequent antigenic drifts 
(137). In addition to mutations at the antibody binding sites, the change in antigenicity of 
H1N1 virus was associated with glycosylation in the globular head of the HA protein 
(138). 
Antigenic drift has also been reported for IAVs that infect swine. For example, 
antigenic variants of classical H1N1 SIVs were reported in the United States during 
1992-1994 (139-141). H1N1 SIVs isolated from the North American swine population 
were divided into multiple antigenic clusters, inducing α, β, γ, δ-1, and δ-2 (142). Similar 
to that, at least two distinct antigenic clusters, H3N2 SIV-alpha and H3N2 SIV-beta, were 
identified in the H3N2 SIVs that circulate among the swine population in the United 
States during 2006-2012 (143). In Europe, antigenic drift was reported for the H3N2 
SIVs from multiple countries in the 1990s, including the Netherlands and Belgium (144), 
and Italy (145). 
Host Switch 
IAVs present partial restriction in terms of host range with occurrences of 
interspecies transmission. HA glycoprotein is considered the major determinant for host 
range due to its role in recognition of and binding to the host cell receptor (9). HAs of 
human IAVs prefer to bind to SA2,6Gal, whereas those of AIVs preferentially bind to 
SA2,3Gal. Amino acid mutations in the receptor binding site could confer the change in 
receptor binding specificity, and specific mutations vary among the HAs of different 
viruses. For example, amino acid mutations Q226L and G228S (H3 numbering) are 
linked with increased binding affinity to SA2,6Gal for human H2 and H3 IAVs (146, 
147). Amino acid mutations E190D and G225D (H3 numbering) are crucial for increased 
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binding affinity to SA2,6Gal for H1 IAVs infecting humans and swine (148). In addition 
to the HA gene segment, molecular features associated with host switch were identified 
in other gene segments. For example, approximately 20 amino acids deletion in the stalk 
region of NA protein is considered one characteristic feature in the host switch of AIVs 
from waterfowl to domestic poultry (149, 150); and this molecular feature could be a 
compensatory change to maintain the functional compatibility between HA and NA 
proteins (151). Molecular changes in the genes that code polymerase proteins, including 
E627K and D701N substitutions in PB2 gene segment, could be associated with 
increased replication ability in the cells of new hosts (152-155). 
Vaccination 
Vaccination is considered one of the primary options to prevent and control 
influenza outbreaks among humans. The World Health Organization (WHO) Influenza 
Program was established to address the threat brought to public health by influenza since 
1948 (156, 157). Vaccine against influenza A and B viruses were invented in the 1940s 
(158). The trivalent inactivated vaccine was developed after the 1968 influenza pandemic 
(159). Currently, the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System comprises 
more than 100 national influenza centers and six collaborating centers around the world 
(160). A large number of influenza samples were collected and analyzed through this 
network on a yearly basis. Recommendation of the viral seed strain in the vaccine for the 
upcoming influenza season was made on the basis of antigenic, genetic, and 
epidemiological data. The vaccine seed strain is determined to be updated when there is 
significant antigenic difference between the existing vaccine strain and the emerging 
strain; and the emerging strain may cause human infections in a wide geographic region. 
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The WHO consultation is head twice a year, every February for the upcoming Northern 
hemisphere influenza season and every September for the upcoming Southern 
hemisphere influenza season, respectively. The trivalent vaccines are recommended to 
contain two influenza A strains and one influenza B strain; and the quadrivalent vaccines 
are recommended to include an additional influenza B strain. 
Although the existing WHO influenza surveillance program is considered one of 
the best-developed systems for infectious disease, it still has several shortcomings. First, 
the selection of vaccine seed strain is based on the prediction of the predominant viral 
strain for the upcoming influenza season; however, a new antigenic variant could emerge 
and quickly spread after recommendation of the vaccine seed strain is made. Second, 
ferret sera were used for antigenic characterization in the existing system, and this may 
have limitation in accurately predicting vaccination-induced responses in humans (161-
163). This was shown by the poor performance of the 2014-2015 Northern Hemisphere 
influenza vaccines attributed to a mismatch of H3N2 vaccine component with epidemic 
strains in circulation (161). Third, the existing system mainly consider the two surface 
glycoproteins, HA and NA; however, genome wide interaction may contribute to the 
evolutionary dynamics of seasonal influenza virus (120). Fourth, antigenic 
characterization through current laboratory methods is relatively time-consuming, hence, 
only a relatively small number of influenza samples can be antigenically characterized. 
The conventional strategy for controlling the spread of avian influenza outbreaks 
among domestic poultry involves enforcement of biosecurity measures, diagnostics and 
surveillance, and culling of infected birds. Culling of infected birds is one of the 
conventional approaches to control the HPAI outbreaks. The strategies for control of 
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LPAI outbreaks vary from no action to active eradication programs including culling of 
infected birds. In addition to these conventional methods, vaccination programs have 
been implemented in multiple countries to control AIV outbreaks among domestic 
poultry. In North America, vaccine program against AIV was introduced in 1995 to 
control the HPAI H5N2 virus in Mexico (164); vaccine was used against a 2003 H7N2 
AIV outbreak in Connecticut, the United States, and against the on-going H7N3 AIV 
outbreak in Mexico. In Eurasia, vaccine has been used in Pakistan since 1995 to control 
H7N3 virus; vaccine was used against H7N1 virus in 2000 and against H7N3 virus in 
2002 in Italy. Vaccination program against LPAI H9N2 virus has been implemented in 
China since 1998. Vaccination program against HPAI H5N1 virus was initially 
implemented in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China in 2012. Afterwards, 
more than 113 billion doses of vaccine have been used against HPAI H5N1 virus in 14 
countries during 2002-2010. Nationwide vaccination programs were carried out in China, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Egypt, all of which account for 99% of the vaccine used against 
HPAI H5N1 virus (165). The use of vaccine can reduce or prevent clinical disease; 
reduce or eliminate virus shedding into the environment from infected birds, which 
would help prevent the spread of virus to uninfected flocks; and increase the resistance of 
birds to becoming infected. Early experience showed that vaccination program could 
serve as a valuable component in a successful AIV control strategy. 
The implementation of vaccination program has been associated with the 
antigenic evolution of AIVs circulating among domestic poultry. For instance, 
vaccination program was suggested to facilitate the genetic evolution of HPAI H5 viruses 
circulating among domestic poultry; a 2011 study showed that HA gene of HPAI H5N1 
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virus isolated from countries where vaccination was implemented genetically evolved 
faster than those from countries where vaccination was not implemented (166). In 
addition, vaccination program has been associated with the antigenic evolution of HPAI 
H5N2 virus in Mexico. Vaccination program was introduced to control the HPAI H5N2 
outbreak among domestic chicken in 1995 (167). After that, two novel genetic lineages 
emerged; viruses in these two lineages underwent antigenic drift and acquired a more 
than 4-fold antigenic difference from the vaccine strain (168). Moreover, antigenic 
characterization of 41 H7N3 AIV strains isolated during the 2002-2004 epidemic in Italy 
showed significant antigenic difference between the viruses isolated prior to the 
implementation of vaccination program and those after the vaccination program (169). 
Knowledge Gaps and Objectives of this Dissertation 
Collectively, periodic introductions of IAVs from wild birds contribute to the 
emergence of novel strains that cause infections in humans, lower mammals, and 
domestic poultry. Vaccination is considered one of the primary options to prevent and 
control human influenza outbreaks; and vaccination program could also contribute to a 
successful AIV control strategy. Antigenic match between vaccine seed strain and 
circulating viral strains is one of the keys to a successful influenza vaccination program. 
Thus, it is critical to characterize the genesis of emerging avian origin IAVs and 
understand the antigenic diversity of contemporary IAVs. Such analyses could provide 
important information for formulation of effective disease control and prevention 
strategies. Although our understanding has been greatly improved, there are a few 




First, a novel LPAI H10N8 virus emerged and caused three human infections in 
Jiangxi, China since December 2013 (170). Genetic analysis showed that the novel virus 
was a reassortant with HA and NA gene segments originating from wild bird origin IAVs 
and the six internal gene segments from the H9N2 virus circulating among domestic 
poultry in the region. However, the source of human infection with the H10N8 virus was 
not determined. 
Southern China is hypothesized to be an influenza epicenter (171), and the 
emergence and zoonotic transmission of novel AIVs were favored by a unique set of 
ecological conditions, including the large domestic duck population and the widespread 
live poultry market (LPM) system (172-175). The threat brought by the ecosystem in the 
region was repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence and zoonotic transmission of 
H5N1, H9N2, and H7N9 viruses (20, 176, 177). 
LPMs have been recognized as playing an important role in the epidemiology of 
IAVs (173, 178, 179). LPMs host various avian species from different sources in a dense 
environment and serve as an optimal site for maintenance and diversification of influenza 
virus. For example, LPAI H5N2 viruses had been isolated from LPMs in the United 
States during 1986–1989 (178, 180). LPAI H7N2 virus was first identified in the LPMs 
in the Northeast United States in 1994, and it has been continued to circulate until 2006 
(129, 181). Evidence for reassortment of H7N2 AIVs with other AIVs circulating in the 
LPMs was observed. In addition, LPMs provide an environment for contact between 
humans and infected live animals, which allows the potential zoonotic transmission of 
AIVs. The association between LPMs and zoonotic transmission was suggested by the 
earlier human infections of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 viruses (182-184). In March 
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2013, a novel LPAI H7N9 virus emerged in eastern China (177) and has become enzootic 
in the region. Since the emergence of H7N9 virus, more than 500 laboratory-confirmed 
cases in human have been reported, of which more than 100 were fatal 
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). LPM was 
identified as the most probable source of human infections with H7N9 virus (177, 185). 
This was further supported by the evidence showing temporally closure of LPMs in 
major Chinese cities after the initial outbreak of H7N9 virus significantly reduced the 
number of human infections (186, 187). We hypothesized that LPM is the source of 
H10N8 human infections. 
Second, the emergence of HPAI viruses in domestic poultry has been associated 
with introductions of LPAI viruses from wild birds, but the mechanisms of emergence are 
unclear. In January 2016, a novel HPAI H7N8 virus emerged and caused high mortality 
among turkey flock in Indiana, United States. The genesis of this H7N8 virus is not 
understood. 
Following introductions into domestic poultry, LPAI H5 and H7 viruses have the 
potential to evolve into HPAI viruses through two mechanisms: 1) acquisition of basic 
amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein by insertion or substitution (188), 
and 2) recombination with another gene segment(s) or host genome (60, 63, 123). HPAI 
viruses are of concern because of the direct and indirect losses that may be incurred by 
the poultry industry through mortality of affected birds, culling of flocks to prevent 
spread, trade restrictions, and increased costs associated with outbreak response. 
The consequences of introductions of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry 
has been repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence of novel HPAIs in Eurasia, including 
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H5N1 (20), H7N1 (189), and H7N7 viruses (19). In the Americas, HPAI H5 viruses 
caused outbreaks among domestic poultry in 1983 (190), 1994 (191), and 2014 and 2015 
(71). In addition to subtype H5 viruses, HPAI H7 viruses have been frequently reported 
in the Americas. There were four reported HPAI H7N3 outbreaks between 2002 and 
present: one outbreak in Chile (2002) (60), two distinct outbreaks in Canada (2004 and 
2007) (61, 62), and one outbreak in Mexico (2012). In addition to affect domestic 
poultry, HPAIs H5N1, H7N3 (Canada in 2004 and Mexico in 2012), and H7N7 viruses 
also caused human infections (20, 64, 192, 193). 
Retrospective studies have often been conducted to determine the putative 
precursor viruses leading to the emergence of IAV strains that cause outbreak among 
domestic poultry. Wild birds have been recognized as the most probable source for 
outbreak strains or at least a few of the gene segments that were incorporated into the 
genome of the outbreak strains (194, 195). However, in many instances, evidence is 
lacking regarding the time of emergence, location of reassortment, and bird species 
associated with the genesis of a particular IAV outbreak strain; limited availability of 
contemporary wild bird-origin IAV isolates or sequences impedes any attempt to 
investigate the potential mechanisms underlying the emergence. 
We hypothesized that 1) the H7N8 virus identified in turkeys in Indiana was 
initially introduced from wild birds and developed high pathogenicity within poultry 
production systems; 2) genetic analysis of a large number of available contemporary wild 
bird–origin IAV isolates would indicate what wild bird species and IAVs contributed to 
the emergence of the HPAI H7N8 virus. 
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Third, earlier studies showed minor antigenic diversity for H7 AIVs isolated from 
wild birds in Eurasia (195, 196); however, limited data is available for antigenic diversity 
of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. H7 AIVs present a continuous threat to 
both public and animal health. Vaccination program is considered a useful component of 
a successful control strategy against AIV and has been implemented in multiple 
countries. Because IAVs frequently undergo antigenic change, circulating influenza 
strains should be continually monitored to optimize the antigenic matches between 
vaccine seed strain and circulating strains. Thus, understating the antigenic diversity of 
contemporary H7 AIVs is crucial for a successful vaccination program.  
The objectives of this dissertation research were to infer the genesis of two 
emerging avian origin IAVs, LPAI H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses, and to investigate 
the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of H7 AIVs from North America. The 
overall hypotheses of this dissertation were: 1) genetically, a persistent gene constellation 
of IAVs circulating among wild birds favors the emergence of novel IAVs that cause 
outbreaks among domestic poultry and human; 2) antigenically, IAVs have reached a 
point of stasis in wild birds but not in domestic poultry. To validate the hypotheses, four 
specific objectives were proposed. 
First, develop and validate a web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling 
next generation sequencing (NGS) data for influenza viruses. 
Second, characterize the genesis of a novel LPAI H10N8 virus and identify the 
source of H10N8 human infection in China.   
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Third, characterize the genesis of a novel HPAI H7N8 virus and recover the 
evolutionary pathway leading to the outbreak of disease among domestic turkey in 
Indiana, the United States. 
Last, characterize the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of contemporary 
H7 AIVs isolated from North American wild and domestic birds during 1971-2012.  
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter I introduces the 
background of IAVs and states the hypotheses, and objectives of this dissertation 
research. A web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data for influenza 
viruses is presented in Chapter II. Chapter III investigates the genesis of a novel LPAI 
H10N8 virus that emerged and caused three human infections in China, 2013. Study in 
chapter IV investigates the potential origins, evolutionary pathways, and introduction 
routes of a novel HPAI H7N8 virus that caused disease outbreak among turkey flocks in 
Indiana, the United States, 2016. Chapter V describes the antigenic diversity and genetic 
evolution of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. Conclusions of this 




A WEB-BASED PIPELINE FOR  
ANALYZING AND ASSEMBLING NGS DATA OF IAVS 
NGS has become a routine method in influenza virus research. To date, there is a 
lack of publically available pipelines for analyzing and assembling NGS data of influenza 
virus. There are two major challenges for development of such a pipeline: rapid 
identification of eight optimal reference sequences from a large influenza database 
corresponding to eight gene segments in the influenza genome; determination of the 
origin of short reads and assembly of homologous genomic sequences in mixed infection 
sample. In this chapter, a web-based pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data of 
influenza viruses is developed and validated. This pipeline could be applied to evaluate 
the quality of NGS data, to identify the eight suitable reference sequences for influenza 
genome, to assemble the full genome, and to evaluate whether there is a mixed infection 
of multiple IAVs in the sample. In addition, the web-based application provides a user-
friendly graphic interface and visualization for users. This pipeline is comparable in 
performance to the commercially available software represented by CLC Genomics 
Workbench but enabled the genomic analysis and assembly of influenza NGS data in a 




The availability of NGS technology has allowed us to rapidly sequence influenza 
genomes; and NGS has become a routine method in molecular diagnosis, surveillance, 
vaccine strain selection, and laboratory research for influenza viruses. The NGS data are 
characterized by high throughput of relative short reads. For example, the read length is 
usually less than 300 bp for NGS data generated by Illumina. The challenge in NGS data 
analyses is to accurately assemble these short reads into the IAV genomic sequences and 
still represent the polymorphisms of these sequences. 
To date, there still lacks of publically available pipelines for analyzing and 
assembling NGS data of influenza virus. Influenza virus genome is comprised of eight 
single strand negative-sense RNA gene segments, and thus genomic assembly will 
require eight closely matched reference sequences. Moreover, influenza virus assembly 
could be impeded by the mixed infection of multiple influenza viruses in the sample. 
Considering the relative conservation of influenza gene segments, especially six internal 
gene segments, it is not a trivial task to differentiate the origin of short reads and then 
assembly them into homologous genomic sequences. 
The objective of this chapter is to develop and validate a web-based pipeline for 
analyzing and assembling NGS data for influenza viruses. The pipeline is designed to 
aggregate a series of existing computational tools for NGS data preprocessing, template 
matching, and genomic assembly, enabling the assembly of influenza genome and the 
detection of mixed infection in a high throughput manner. The web-based application is 
expected to provide user-friendly interface and visualization for the users. 
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Materials and Methods 
Data Preprocessing 
The designed web-based pipeline comprises multiple steps, including quality 
control, trimming, reference search, genome assembly, and mix-infection detection 
(Figure 1). The pipeline starts with investigation of the overall quality of the raw NGS 
data with FastQC v0.10.1 (197). It generates composition statistics of the raw data, 
including read number, read length, and base quality. The reads in the raw data are 
trimmed with Trimmomatic v0.32 (198). In this step, nucleotide bases are removed from 
both ends of the read if their quality falls below a pre-defined threshold; and the read is 
clipped if the average quality within a sliding window falls below a threshold quality. 
After that, reads above a specified length are retained for further analyses. The quality of 
the trimmed reads is once again investigated with FastQC v0.10.1. 
Genome Assembly 
This pipeline enables two modes for sequence assembly: reference-based 
assembly and de novo assembly. The reference-based assembly refers to the case when a 
reference influenza genome is provided, and then trimmed reads could be directly 
mapped to the reference with the implementation of Bowtie v2.0 (199). Local alignment 
and pair-end mode are used for reads mapping. The de novo assembly mode is initiated 
when a reference genome is not available beforehand. In this case, trimmed reads are de 
novo assembled to create contiguous sequence with Velvet v1.2.10 (200). The resulting 
contigs are searched against the influenza nucleotide database by BLAST (201) and eight 
reference sequences corresponding to eight gene segments are selected. Subsequently, the 
influenza genome is assembled as described in the reference-based assembly mode. Each 
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nucleotide base in the consensus sequence is determined on the basis of two criteria: (1) it 
is supported by a specified mapping coverage, and (2) consensus is reached among reads 
cover this position. The subtype of a sample is determined on the basis of the reference 
sequences selected for the HA and NA gene segments. When de novo assembly generates 
multiple HA and/or NA gene segments corresponding to distinct subtypes, the sample is 
identified as a mixed infection sample. 
 
Figure 1 Pipeline for analyzing and assembling NGS data of influenza virus. 
 
Web-based Application 
To provide a user-friendly graphic interface and visualization tool, a web-based 
application was developed for this influenza genome assembly pipeline. Two assembly 
modes, reference-based assembly and de novo assembly, are provided to users as an 
option. In the reference-based mode (Figure 2), the user will provide NGS data and a 
table that comprises the GenBank accession numbers of the eight reference sequences for 
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each sample. Reference sequences will then be obtained from influenza nucleotide 
database by the given accession numbers. In addition, users will be asked to provide 
parameters for each step in the analysis. For example, threshold quality, sliding window 
size, and read threshold length are needed for quality trimming; threshold coverage and 
level of consensus are needed for determining the nucleotide base for each position in the 
consensus sequence. In the de novo assembly mode, users will provide k-mer length for 




Figure 2 Reference-based assembly mode submission interface. 
 
After the analysis, a number of statistics will be provided to users in form of 
graphics. These statistics include read number and average base quality in the raw NGS 
data and trimmed data, percentile of raw reads retained following quality trimming, 
percentile of read that were mapped to the reference genome, and coverage of the 
consensus sequences. Users could download these plots and various formats are 
supported. The resulting genomic sequence files are provided in both gene-specific and 
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sample-specific manners. In addition, the mapping profiles of each sample are available 
for users to assess the mapping quality. On the website, users could monitor the progress 
of the job and each of its stages in real-time (Figure 3). Our server will notify users when 
the job starts and completes via emails. The web-based application was written in PHP 
with a core written in Perl. It is freely accessible on SystemsBio Lab website 
(http://sysbio.cvm.msstate.edu). 
 
Figure 3 Job status page (job complete). 
 
Testing Datasets and Performance Evaluation 
Two datasets were used to evaluate the performance of this web-based influenza 
genome assembly pipeline. The reference-based mode was investigated with the first 
dataset that comprises NGS data for five influenza reassortants generated through 
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reassortment between a canine H3N2 virus (A/canine/Guangdong/1/2006, H3N2, 
Guangdong/1) and a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (A/California/04/2009, H1N1, 
California/04). The HA gene segment of these reassortants originated from the canine 
H3N2 virus and the other seven gene segments were derived from either parental virus. 
The complete genomes of these two parental strains were downloaded from GenBank 
under the accession number GU433345 to GU433352 and FJ966079 to FJ966086 and 
used as references for genome assembly. 
The second dataset comprises NGS data for five wild bird origin AIV strains 
obtained from earlier surveillance. The subtype of these samples and origin of each gene 
segment are unknown. The genomes of these samples were assembled with the de novo 
mode imbedded in this pipeline. The resulting genomic sequences were compared with 
those generated by CLC Genomics Workbench 9.0.1 (CLC bio, Aarhus, Denmark), 
which is a commercially available software that provides genomic analyses and assembly 
package. In CLC Genomics Workbench, trimmed reads were de novo assembled to 
generate continuous sequences using the contig sequences (fast) mode and the contig 
length threshold was set to 200. Reads were mapped to the references that were found by 
BLAST the resulting contigs to influenza nucleotide database. 
Results 
Under the reference-based assembly mode, this pipeline first investigates the 
quality of the raw NGS data for the five reassortant viruses. Quality control results 
showed that the number of read pair for each sample ranges from 289,554 to 347,858. 
The length of reads falls in the range from 32 bp to 301 bp. The average quality score for 
each position range from 34.45 to 36.64. The quality of the raw NGS data was improved 
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through quality trimming. Quality trimming retained around 85% of the reads in the raw 
data and increased the average base quality to the range between 36.59 and 37.43 (Figure 
4). 
Examination of the mapping profile showed that more than 98.95% of the 
trimmed reads were successfully mapped to the eight reference sequences for each 
sample. A 100% coverage was observed for all eight reference sequences for each sample 
and the average mapping depth for each reference sequence ranges from 2,855 to 7,642. 
The consensus sequences generated by this pipeline were compared with those obtained 
from GenBank. Among the 40 newly generated genomic sequences, 19 sequences 
corresponding to six gene segments were identical to those from GenBank; and 21 
sequences corresponding to the remaining nine gene segments possess one to six 
nucleotide substitutions. The nucleotide substitutions were consistent for genomic 
sequences corresponding to gene segment derived from the same parental virus. For 
example, five genomic sequences of the HA gene segment originated from the canine 
H3N2 virus all have two nucleotide differences: A695T and T713G. Further investigation 
of the mapping profile showed adequate mapping depth and consensus for these 
positions. The nucleotide substitutions were not introduced by this pipeline but may 
originate from manipulation of these samples such as adaptation during viral culture. 
These results suggested that the reference-based assembly mode in this pipeline could 





Figure 4 Reference-based assembly mode result page.  
 
Next, the performance of the de novo assembly mode was investigated. Among 
the five tested samples, eight reference sequences corresponding to eight gene segments 
were found for four samples. Thus, these four samples were designed as single infection. 
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More than 99.00% of the trimmed reads were successfully mapped to the references. A 
100% coverage was observed for the eight reference sequences of four single infection 
samples and the average mapping depth for each reference sequence ranges from 862 to 
6,817 (Figure 5). Genomic sequences generated by this pipeline were compared with 
those by Genomics Workbench and results showed a 100% sequence identity. For the last 
sample, this pipeline found nine reference sequences comprising two references for the 
NA gene segment corresponding to the subtype N2 and N7, respectively. The resulting 
sequences from this pipeline comprise two complete NA sequences of the subtype N2 
and N7. In addition, one reference sequence of the subtype H7 was identified for the HA 
gene segment. Thus, this sample was assigned to mixed infection on the basis of these 
results. 
 




In summary, a publically available web-based pipeline for analyzing and 
assembling NGS data of influenza virus was developed. This pipeline enables the 
detection of eight closely matched references, full genomic assembly for influenza 
genome, and detection of the presence of mixed infection of multiple IAVs in a sample. 
The web-based application provides a user-friendly graphic interface and visualization 
for users. The pitfall of this study is that, for a sample with mixed infections, this pipeline 





THE GENESIS OF A NOVEL LPAI H10N8 VIRUS AND THE SOURCE OF  
H10N8 HUMAN INFECTIONS IN CHINA 
In December 2013, a novel LPAI H10N8 virus emerged, causing three human 
infections in Jiangxi, China (170). Genetic analysis showed that the novel virus was a 
reassortant comprising HA and NA gene segments from wild bird origin IAVs and the six 
internal gene segments from the H9N2 viruses circulating among domestic poultry in the 
region; however, the source of human infections with the novel LPAI H10N8 virus was 
not determined. LPMs have been identified as a high risk factor for the zoonotic 
transmission of AIVs in Southern China (182) and we hypothesized that LPMs are the 
source of H10N8 human infections. We characterized 361 samples collected from April 
2013 to January 2014, including 217 samples collected prior to the detection of H10N8 
human infection, at the LPM visited by the first index case. Results showed a gradual 
increase in IAV prevalence and detection of H10 viruses. AIVs that are genetically close 
to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered from samples collected in this LPM. In 
addition, we performed HI assays for 800 sera samples collected from chickens and 
ducks at five LPMs in Nanchang and observed high seroprevalence of H10 virus. These 
findings suggested that LPM is the most probable source of human infection with this 
novel H10N8 virus, and this virus appears to present throughout the LPM system in the 
city. These findings highlight the role of LPMs in the zoonotic transmission of AIVs, and 
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suggest influenza ecosystem in Southern China could favor the emergence of novel IAV 
strains that potentially present risk to both animal and human health. Reduction of the 
influenza virus burden in LPMs is essential in preventing future emergence of novel IAV 
strains with zoonotic and pandemic potential. 
Introduction 
LPMs are considered as an important link in the ecology and epidemiology of 
IAVs (173). LPMs host a large number of birds among different species in a high-density 
setting. Live animals are usually brought into the LPMs on a daily basis, and live animals 
could be carried over in LPMs from one day to the next and even up to weeks for some 
birds. Thus, LPMs provide an ideal environment for maintenance and transmission of 
IAVs among these birds and facilitate diversification of IAVs through reassortment. In 
addition, LPMs provide an environment for direct contact between humans and infected 
live animals and could serve as the source of potential zoonotic transmission of IAVs.  
In the United States, LPAI H7N2 virus was detected in the LPMs in the northeast 
in 1994, and this virus continued to circulate in the LPMs until 2006 (129, 181). 
Reassortment was observed between LPAI H7N2 and other IAVs circulating in the 
LPMs. In 2003, a LPAI H7N2 virus strain was isolated from an immunocompromised 
man with fever and community-acquired pneumonia in New York (202). Although the 
source of this human infection case could not be determined, the virus was suspected to 
originate from the LPMs. 
In China, the association between LPMs and zoonotic transmission of AIVs was 
suggested by reported human infections of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 viruses (Figure 
6). In May 1997, an avian origin H5N1 IAV strain was isolated from a boy died of 
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respiratory illness in Hong Kong (20). A total of 18 cases of human infection with the 
H5N1 virus were reported in Hong Kong by the end of the year and six cases were fatal. 
Human infections with LPAI H9N2 virus were reported in China in 1999 (176), 2003 
(203), and 2013 (204), respectively. LPMs were indicated to be the source of human 
infections with H5N1 and H9N2 viruses (182). Human infection with a novel LPAI 
H7N9 virus was first reported in eastern China in March 2013 (177, 185). LPAI H7N9 
virus has caused more than 500 human cases and claimed >100 lives ever since 
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). LPMs were 
also indicated as the most likely source of human infections with the H7N9 virus. This 
was supported by the significant decrease of mean daily number of infections in major 
cities in China following measures taken to close LPMs (186). 
In December 2013, human infection with a novel avian origin H10N8 virus was 
reported in Jiangxi, China. The first patient infected with H10N8 virus was hospitalized 
on November 30, three days after illness onset (170). The patient had visited a local LPM 
four days prior to the illness onset. Genetic analysis results showed that the novel H10N8 
virus was a reassortant possessing HA and NA gene segments from wild bird origin IAVs 
and six internal gene segments from poultry-origin H9N2 virus. Two more cases of 
human infections with this novel H10N8 virus were reported in January and February 
2014, in Jiangxi. The source of human infections with this virus was not determined. We 
hypothesize that local LPMs are the source of human infections and we analyzed 361 
influenza virus samples collected in the LPM visited by the first patient to infer the 





Figure 6 Avian origin influenza A viruses that caused zoonotic infections in Southern 
China during the past two decades. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Sample Collection 
Sampling was conducted in the LPM at the Donghu District of Nanchang City, 
Jiangxi from April 5, 2013 to January 1, 2014. A total of 361 swabs were collected on ten 
individual time periods, April 5 (number of samples, 47), April 9 (13), June 16 (23), July 
25 (64), August 10 (57), August 24 (13), December 12 (46), December 17 (35), 
December 22, 2013 (36), and January 1, 2014 (27) (Table 1). These samples were 
collected predominantly from chicken, duck, goose, and four minor species, including 
pheasant, guinea fowl, pigeon, and turtle doves. In addition, 47 environmental samples 
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were collected by swabbing feces in the cages and on the floor of this LPM, especially 
when samples from live birds were not accessible. The rectal swabs were collected from 
waterfowl species such as ducks and geese, whereas both oropharyngeal and rectal swabs 
were taken from the terrestrial birds, including chickens, pigeons, guinea fowl, and turtle 
doves. 
The swabs from each bird or environmental specimen were placed in a tube with 
M199 transport medium (GIBCO, location) containing 0.5% bovine serum albumin 
(BSA) and Penicillin G (2 X 106 U/liter), Streptomycin 200 mg/liter. Samples were kept 
in an ice box before and during shipment to the laboratory and then stored at -80 °C. All 
manipulations of these samples were conducted under enhanced Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-
2) containment facilities at the College of Animal Science and Technology, Jiangxi 
Agricultural University. 
RNA Extraction and IAV Screening 
Viral RNA was extracted from the clinical swabs using the QIAamp Viral RNA 
mini Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. These 
viral RNA samples were subject to M-gene based IAV screening followed by H7 subtype 
specific screening using the AgPath-ID™ One-Step RT-PCR Reagent according to the 
diagnosis manual from WHO) 
(http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/molecular_diagnosis_ 





The non-H7 positive swabs were inoculated into ten day old specific pathogen 
free chicken embryonated eggs. The eggs were inoculated for 72 hours at 37°C before 
harvesting.  
Hemagglutination and Hemagglutination Inhibition Assays 
Both hemagglutination and hemagglutination inhibition assays were conducted 
according the instruction described in the OIE manual for avian influenza diagnosis using 
0.5% chicken red blood cells 
(http://web.oie.int/fr/normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/2.03.04_AI.pdf). The goat anti-H10 
polyclonal antisera were diluted to 1:40 before the HI assays. 
Reverse Transcription, PCR, and Genomic Sequencing 
The full-length cDNA were amplified from the swabs using SuperScript™ One-
Step RT-PCR (Invitrogen, Grand Island, NY). Briefly, total RNA 5 ul, uni-12 2 ul, dNTP 
1 ul, and RNase/DNase free water 5 ul, were incubated at 65°C for five minutes and then 
one minute on ice. Then 1 ul of DTT, 1 ul of RNAse, and 4 ul of buffer, and 1 ul of RT 
superscript III were added and incubated at 55°C for one hour and then 75°C for 15 
minutes. PCR amplification was performed with universal primers U-12 and U-13 
Phusion® High-fidelity PCR MMW/HF buffer (New England Biolabs, Ipswich, MA) 
according to the manufacturer’s instruction and followed by eight pairs of gene specific 
primers (206). PCR product was then purified using QIAquick® PCR Purification Kit 
(Qiagen, Valencia, CA) according to the manufacturer’s protocol. 
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All M-gene positive samples were subjective to full genome sequencing using 
next generation sequencing. Sequencing libraries were prepared from 1 ng cDNA using 
the Nextera XT kit according to manufacturer’s instructions (Illumina, San Diego, CA). 
Sequencing was performed on an Illumina MiSeq using V2 reagent kits according to the 
manufacturer’s instructions. Sanger sequencing was utilized to fill sequence gaps from 
the MiSeq run using gene specific primers for the corresponding gene segment. The PCR 
product was purified by QIAquick® Gel Extraction Kit (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) 
according to manufacturer’s protocol and subjected to sequencing using ABI 3730xl 
capillary DNA Analyzers. 
Genomic Assembly 
Genomic assembly was conducted with CLC Genomics Workbench 6 (CLC bio, 
Aarhus, Denmark). Quality trimming was first conducted to remove reads with two or 
more ambiguous nucleotides and those below a quality cutoff value of 20. The quality-
filtered reads were de novo assembled in the fast contig mode and then each assembled 
contig was BLAST searched against the influenza database to select the best-matched 
reference sequence. Quality-filtered reads were mapped to the reference sequence and 
consensus sequences were generated. If two or more genetically distinct references were 
identified, the quality-filtered reads were matched to each and multiple consensus 
sequences were generated. If these consensus sequences from a single sample were 
genetically distinct, this sample was defined as a mixed infection. Each consensus 
sequence was examined manually to correct potential assembly errors, such as single 
nucleotide deletions and insertions. 
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Phylogenetic Analysis and Molecular Characterization 
To recover evolutionary history of H10N8 virus, sequences recovered from this 
study were combined with those from public database for phylogenetic analyses. 
Phylogenetic tree was inferred using Maximum Likelihood method implemented in 
GARLI version 0.951 (207). 
Serological Surveillance 
To investigate the spread of H10N8 virus in the LPMs system in Nanchang, we 
collected a total of 800 sera samples from chickens and ducks in five LPMs, from 
February 25, 2014, to March 27, 2014. These five LPMs cover a geographic area of about 
160 square kilometers and the major metropolitan area of Nanchang. Sera positive was 
determined using HI assay with a H10N8 virus isolated from the surveillance. 
Results 
The LPM that the first H10N8 patient visited is in the Donghu district of 
Nanchang City; and we conducted sporadic virologic surveillance at this LPM since April 
2013. The number of poultry retailers within this LPM ranges from 20 to 30, and a total 
of around 1,500 birds are sold per day. The number of poultry retailers and birds being 
sold vary with season change and other factors. Typically about 90% of birds sold in this 
market are chickens and ducks with wild birds occasionally being sold as well. Between 
April 5, 2013, and January 1, 2014, we collected 361 samples from this LPM on ten 
separate sampling occasions (Table 1). These samples included 192 paired oropharyngeal 
and cloacal swabs from chickens, pheasant, guinea fowl, pigeon, and turtle doves, as well 
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as 122 cloacal swabs from ducks and geese. In addition, 47 environmental samples were 
also collected by swabbing feces in the cages and from the floor of this LPM. 
The proportion of IAV positive samples among these collected samples, as 
measured by M-gene real time PCR, increased from 4.3% on April 5, to 38.5% on 
August 24, and to 87.0% on December 12, 2013. The proportion of IAV positive 
samples, albeit still high, dropped to 48.0% on January 1, 2014 (Table 1). Among these 
M-gene positive specimens, ten were subtyped as H7 by H7 specific real time PCR (205) 
and 16 as H10 by H10 specific HI assays (Figure 7, Table 1).  
 
Figure 7 Isolation of H10 influenza A virus from the LPM visited by the first H10N8 
patient. 
 
To determine if H10N8 viruses, had been and had continued to circulate in this 
market, we sequenced positive samples collected on the April, December, and January 
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sampling occasions (the first index case was admitted to the hospital in late November). 
From the April sampling, we sequenced all five positive samples and detected H7 and H9 
HA genes in conjunction with N2 and N9 NA genes. Although no H10 or N8 genes were 
detected, we found PB2, PA, NP, MP, and NS genes were genetically similar to the 
human H10N8 virus. From the December sampling, we successfully generated sequences 
from 44 of the 86 positive samples. Twelve samples contained H10 genes, all of which 
also contained N8 genes, though some did appear to be mixed infections containing gene 
segments from other viruses such as H9N2. From the January sampling, six samples had 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The presence of mixed infections makes it difficult to determine the exact 
genotypes of the viruses. For example, there were 16 samples that contained H10 genes, 
12 that contained H9 genes, two that contained H6 genes, and three that contained two 
HA genes (two H10/H9 and one H7/H9). Among the 16 samples that contained H10 
viruses, only two were of the N8 subtype; the remaining 14 samples were mixed 
infections with both N2 and N8 genes present. The two mixed H10/H9 samples had both 
N2 and N8 NA genes as well. Besides the mixed HA and NA samples, 12 had at least 
two copies of the same gene segments, such as PB2, PB1, NP, MP, and NS, and these 
gene segments were genetically distinct. Of the 57 samples sequenced, 25 samples were 
determined to have at least two genetically distinct influenza viruses. 
Phylogenetic analyses of the generated sequences showed that 18 H10 and 19 N8 
genes forming a monophyletic clade with the corresponding genes of the human H10N8 
virus (Figure 8, Figure 9). The H10 and N8 genes were genetically close to those of 
viruses isolated from wild birds: H10 gene from the Eurasian lineage and N8 gene from 
the North American lineage. In contrast, the internal genes sequenced were close to those 
derived from AIVs circulating among domestic poultry and some are similar to those 
present in the human H10N8 virus 
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_internal_genes_recovered_from_the_samples_collected_at_the_
LPM.pdf). These data confirm that nucleotide sequences of viruses more than 99% 
identical to those of the human H10N8 virus were circulating in this LPM, supporting the 
likelihood that the zoonotic transmission had occurred here. 
The diversity of internal gene segments revealed that multiple distinct viruses 
were circulating in this individual LPM. The PB2 genes were clustered into seven distinct 
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genetic lineages, PB1 into five, PA into four, NP into six, MP into six, and NS into three 
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_internal_genes_recovered_from_the_samples_collected_at_the_
LPM.pdf). Among these genes, PB2 from the 18 samples alone belong to five distinct 
genetic lineages. In contrast, NP, MP, and NS gene of those samples with H10 gene were 
similar. None of the internal genes of these H10N8 samples were unique from those 
found in H9 and other subtypes of IAV from this LPM. The genetic lineages containing 
the samples collected on April 5, 2013, were surprisingly associated with the H10 viruses 





Figure 8 Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of H10 genes recovered from the 
samples collected at the LPM. 
The genes of IAV recovered from our surveillance are marked in red and that from the 




Figure 9 Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of N8 genes recovered from the 
samples collected at the LPM. 
The genes of IAV recovered from our surveillance are marked in red and that from the 
human H10N8 isolate are in green. 
The amino acid sequences at the receptor binding sites of the H10 proteins 
encoded by the genes from this LPM were identical to those in the human H10N8 isolate, 
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and the majority of these sites except 128 (137, H3 position) and 181 (193, H3 position) 
were shown to be divergent from H10 AIVs from public databases: the H10 viruses 
recovered in this study had R128 (100%) and I181 (61%) while those from public 
database predominantly had K (67.8%) and T (97.7%), respectively (Table 3). The 
human H10N8 isolate has R128 and T181. The impact of I181T on host or tissue tropism 
of the H10N8 virus is unknown; nevertheless, the receptor binding properties are 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analysis of NA gene sequences suggests that these viruses are sensitive to 
oseltamivir and other neuraminidase inhibitors (208). However, 94.1% of the M2 
sequences have S31N (209) indicating that they are resistant to amantadine, as was the 
human H10N8 isolate (210) (Table 3). All PB2 genes had E627 whereas the PB2 gene of 
the human H10N8 isolate had K627, which is considered a marker of mammalian 
adaptation (211) (Table 3). 
That we were able to detect H10N8 virus in December and early January 
following human infection raised the question of how widely this virus might be spread 
within the LPM system in the region. To estimate this, we conducted serologic 
surveillance at four additional LPMs in Nanchang city. We collected a total of 800 sera 
from chickens and ducks at these five LPMs, from February 25, 2014, to March 27, 2014 
(Figure 10). These five LPMs cover a geographic area of about 160 square kilometers 
and the major metropolitan area of Nanchang. Using HI assays with a H10N8 virus 
isolated from the surveillance described above and a cutoff of 1:20, we found that 9.4% 
of the 800 sera samples were positive. The H10 positive sera were distributed across all 
five sampled LPMs and from both ducks and chickens. The highest H10 positive 
percentile on a single market and a single sampling period (34.0%) was detected on 
March 9, at LPM A, which the index patient visited (Figure 10). Of note, LPM B located 
across the Gan River from LPM A, had close to 50% H10 positivity by the end of March. 
These data showed that H10 viruses were widespread in the region’s LPM system. 
Although we are unable to determine the exact nature of the H10 virus from these 
serologic studies, two human cases with H10N8 infection in Nanchang (in January and 
February 2014) are consistent with it being the zoonotic virus. Of these two additional 
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human cases, the second human case was documented with a visit to a local LPM prior to 
illness onset whereas the exposure history of the third human case was unclear. 
 
Figure 10 Distribution of H10 seropositive samples collected from February 25 to 
March 27, 2014 and across five LPMs in Nanchang city. 
The seropositive samples were determined by HI assays with a H10N8 virus. LPM A was 
the one that the first index H10N8 patient visited in November 2013. The highest H10 
positive percentile in a single sampling period was marked for each LPM. 
Discussion 
In summary, we show that the LPM visited by the index H10N8 female patient 
was very likely the source of her infection and that the virus appears to have been present 
throughout the LPM system in Nanchang, China. However, the findings in this study 
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were limited by the small number of samples we collected and by the fact that the H10N8 
virus prior to the emergence of the first human case was lacking. It is unclear whether 
these H10N8 viruses were introduced into the LPM system or were generated in the 
LPMs. Continuous influenza surveillance is needed to monitor the epidemiology of the 
novel H10N8 virus in Nanchang as well as those areas that share poultry movements with 
Nanchang. In addition to those minor poultry species, there are a variety of chicken and 
duck species in the LPM; further studies will be needed to identify the reservoir for the 
H10N8 virus among these bird species, and such information will be useful for 
developing effective strategies for prevention and control of the H10N8 virus at the LPM. 
AIVs were identified in LPMs in China a few decades ago. The first LPAI H9N2 
virus was initially isolated from domestic poultry in 1994 (212), and has since been found 
to be endemic among domestic poultry in China (213). Besides infecting poultry, this 
H9N2 virus has caused sporadic infections in humans (176, 203). The H9N2 virus has 
undergone rapid evolution and contemporary H9N2 viruses are both genetically and 
antigenically diverse (214-216). The internal gene segments of H9N2 viruses contributed 
to the genomic diversity of HPAI H5N1 viruses in China (217, 218). The novel LPAI 
H7N9 viruses emerged in Yangze Delta possess six gene segments derived from H9N2 
viruses, and mixed infections of H7N9 and H9N2 viruses are very common (185). This 
study suggested further that novel H10N8 IAVs were frequently co-infected with H9N2 
viruses, and their internal gene constellations were similar to each other. It seems that this 
diverse genetic pool is potentially more dangerous than any single virus. With any chance 
to interact with other subtypes of HA and NA genes, novel reassortants could emerge, 
including some strains that are antigenically distinct from the contemporary human IAVs. 
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These emerging viruses, including H5N1, H7N9, H9N2, and H10N8, are continuous 
threats to public health. 
A large influenza vaccine campaign against HPAI H5N1 viruses has been 
conducted in China since 2004. H9N2 vaccines have also been distributed to domestic 
poultry farms but their implementation has been comparatively less effective. With the 
substantial subtype and genetic diversity of viruses within LPMs, vaccination is not a 
realistic strategy to reduce the levels of virus circulation and subsequent zoonotic 
infections. Other intervention strategies must, therefore, be used to control viral flow into 
the LPMs. As it seems impossible to close all LPMs simultaneously, more practical 
policies and approaches such as routine surveillance and regular market disinfection 




THE GENESIS OF A NOVEL HPAI H7N8 VIRUS AND THE EVOLUTIONARY 
PATHWAY LEADING TO OUTBREAK AMONG DOMESTIC POULTRY  
IN INDIANA, THE UNITED STATES 
Introductions of LPAI viruses of subtypes H5/H7 into poultry from wild birds 
have the potential to mutate to HPAI, but such viruses’ origin is often unclear. In January 
2016, a novel H7N8 HPAI virus caused an outbreak in turkeys in Indiana, USA. To 
determine the virus’s origin, we sequenced genomes of 441 wild bird–origin IAVs from 
North America and subjected them to evolutionary analyses. Results showed that the 
H7N8 LPAI virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the Mississippi flyway 
during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana turkeys, in which it 
evolved into a HPAI form. Preceding the outbreak, an isolate with six gene segments 
(except NP and MP) sharing >99% sequence identity with those of H7N8 turkey viruses 
was recovered from a diving duck. H4N8 IAVs from diving duck possessed five H7N8–
like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS). Our findings suggest that viral gene 
constellations circulating among diving ducks can contribute towards the emergence of 
IAVs that can affect poultry. Diving ducks may serve as a unique reservoir, contributing 




IAVs exist in a complex ecosystem that involves various hosts, including humans, 
swine, horses, dogs, sea mammals, and numerous wild and domestic bird species. Among 
these hosts, wild aquatic birds are considered the natural reservoir for IAVs and bird 
migration plays an important role in the dispersal of IAVs. Interactions of migratory bird 
at congregation sites enable transmission of IAVs and facilitate genetic diversity through 
reassortment. Periodic introduction of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry 
contributes to emergence of novel IAV strains that occasionally cause outbreaks among 
domestic poultry. Following such introductions into domestic poultry, LPAI H5 and H7 
viruses have the potential to evolve into HPAI viruses through two mechanisms: 1) 
acquisition of basic amino acids in the cleavage region of the HA protein by insertion or 
substitution (188), and 2) recombination with another gene segment(s) or host genome 
(60, 63, 123). HPAI virus is of particular concern because of the devastating consequence 
it brings to the poultry industry; in some outbreaks, mortality could be as high as 100%. 
The threats brought by the introduction of entire IAVs or IAV gene segments 
from wild birds to domestic poultry has been repeatedly demonstrated by the emergence 
of novel HPAIs in the Americas. HPAI H5 viruses caused outbreaks of disease among 
domestic poultry in 1983 (190), 1994 (191), and 2014 and 2015 (71). In addition to 
subtype H5 viruses, HPAI H7 viruses have been frequently reported in the Americas. 
There were four reported HPAI H7N3 outbreaks between 2002 and 2016: one outbreak in 
Chile (2002) (60), two distinct outbreaks in Canada (2004 and 2007) (61, 62), and one 
outbreak in Mexico (2012). High mortality among domestic poultry was reported for 
these four HPAI H7N3 outbreaks. Moreover, HPAI H7N3 strains isolated from the 
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outbreak in Canada (2004) caused mild respiratory symptoms and conjunctivitis in at 
least two humans (192). HPAI H7N3 strains from the outbreak in Mexico (2012) caused 
conjunctivitis in two poultry workers (64). 
Studies conducted after outbreaks among domestic poultry have usually been 
retrospective analyses to determine the identities of the putative precursors of the 
outbreak strains. However, direct evidence is lacking on the time of emergence, location 
for reassortment, and wild bird species that contribute to the genesis of a particular HPAI 
strain. In most cases, the limited surveillance in wild birds prior to the detection of a 
novel HPAI strain impedes our understanding of the mechanisms underlining the 
emergence. 
On January 15, 2016, The United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) announced the detection of a novel HPAI H7N8 
virus in a commercial turkey flock experiencing significant mortality in Dubois Country, 
Indiana. APHIS reported the identification of LPAI H7N8 virus in eight turkey flocks in 
the control area surrounding the location of the initial HPAI case. The detection of this 
virus represents the first identification of HPAI H7N8 virus in domestic species. The 
objective of study in this chapter was to understand the molecular mechanisms leading to 
the emergence of this novel H7N8 virus.  
We hypothesized that 1) the H7N8 virus identified in turkeys in Indiana was 
initially introduced from wild birds and developed high pathogenicity within poultry 
production systems; 2) genetic analysis of a large number of available contemporary wild 
bird-origin IAV isolates would indicate what wild bird species and IAVs contributed to 
the emergence of the HPAI H7N8 virus. In a collaborative effort, our team sequenced 
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441 IAVs obtained through wild bird influenza surveillance during 2007–2016 across 
North America. We used the sequence data generated in this study together with the IAV 
genomes recovered in association with the H7N8 outbreak in Indiana turkey and public 
sequence data to infer the possible origin(s), evolutionary pathway(s), and transmission 
route(s) of this novel HPAI H7N8 virus.  
Materials and Methods 
Viruses  
To determine the genetic ancestry of the H7N8 IAV strains associated with the 
outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys, we sequenced a collection of 441 archived wild 
bird–origin IAVs obtained throughout North America from influenza surveillance during 
2007–2016 (Figure 11). The wild bird–origin isolates represent strains recovered from 
Alberta, Canada, and from 38 states within the United States of America. IAVs from 
migratory birds from the Atlantic, Central, Mississippi, and Pacific flyways were 
included in our dataset. Complete genomes of H7N8 IAVs detected in Indiana turkeys 
were downloaded from GenBank: (accession nos. KU558903–KU558910 and 
KU585905–KU585920). One of the strains was a HPAI virus, A/turkey/Indiana/16-
001403-1/2016(H7N8) (Indiana/16-001403-1), and the other two strains were LPAI 



































































































































































































































































Preliminary phylogenetic analyses were performed with the complete genomes of 
three H7N8 strains originating from turkeys in Indiana and a genomic sequence dataset 
(219) that represents the two major geographically dependent genetic lineages, North 
American and Eurasian, for eight gene segments. The next round of phylogenetic 
analyses were conducted with an integrated dataset that comprised the complete genomes 
of three H7N8 turkey strains, sequence data for 441 IAVs generated in this study, and 
sequence data downloaded in May 2016 from the Influenza Research Database (220) for 
IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas. The number of genomic 
sequences used in analyses for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=7762), 
PB1 (n=7813), PA (n=7859), HA (n=1132), NP (n=7327), NA (n=1611), MP (n=7776), 
and NS (n=7586). In order to perform more detailed analysis on the timing of the 
emergence of the H7N8 viruses, sequences closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains 
(referred to henceforth as ‘the H7N8–outbreak lineage’) were selected for each gene 
segment from the phylogenetic trees. The number of genomic sequences used in analyses 
for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=796), PB1 (n=709), PA (n=757), HA 
(n=721), NP (n=651), NA (n=281), MP (n=742), and NS (n=526). 
Gene segment–specific phylogenetic trees were generated using the maximum–
likelihood method implemented in RAxML v8.1.17 (221). A general time–reversible 
model of nucleotide substitution and a gamma–distributed rate variation among sites was 
applied throughout the analyses. Sequence alignments were performed by using 
MUSCLE v3.8 (222). We manually examined alignments to ensure accuracy and retained 




We estimated the time–scaled phylogenies, nucleotide substitution rate, and time 
to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo method implemented in BEAST v1.8.0 (223). Genomic sequences with complete 
sampling dates (exact month, day, year) were selected for each gene segment from the 
H7N8–outbreak lineage on the basis of phylogenetic trees, and the number of genomic 
sequences used in analyses for each gene segment is as follows: PB2 (number=268), PB1 
(n=227), PA (n=225), HA (n=206), NP (n=224), NA (n=102), MP (n=220), and NS 
(n=160). We used the SRD06 partitioned substitution model, uncorrelated lognormal 
relaxed clock model, and Bayesian skyline coalescent tree prior in the analyses. For each 
gene segment, we performed two independent runs with a chain length of 100–300 
million steps sampled every 10,000 steps (results in >10,000 samples per run). The 
results were analyzed in Tracer v1.6 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/). Adequate 
burn–in was determined from the trace of each run, and 2%–10% of the initial steps, 
representing poor configuration, were removed from further analysis. Convergence of 
each run and consistency between two runs was assessed, and results from two runs were 
combined for analyses to ensure an adequate effective sample size (>200) was reached 
for relevant parameters. The maximum clade credibility trees were summarized with 
TreeAnnotator v1.8.0 (http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/TreeAnnotator/) and edited in FigTree 
v1.4.0 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/). 
Discrete Phylogeographic Analyses 
The hosts of IAVs in our study were categorized into 11 different groups: 
dabbling duck, diving duck (including sea duck), goose and swan, gull and tern, 
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passerine, poultry, raptor, seabird, shorebird, other avian, and other non–avian hosts. In 
an attempt to keep the number of sequences per host group as balanced as possible, we 
conducted sub–sampling for sequences within the H7N8–outbreak lineage for each gene 
segment. For each sampling year, 20 sequences were selected for each host group; if a 
host group had <20 sequences, all sequences were retained. For the analysis, we used an 
asymmetric substitution model with the Bayesian Stochastic Search Variable Selection 
and a strict clock model. Two independent runs of chain length of 150 million steps with 
sampling every 10,000 steps (results in 15,000 samples per run) were performed for each 
gene segment. Similar approach for analyzing the resulting log files of molecular clock 
data was applied to analyze burn–in, convergence of each run, and generate maximum 
clade credibility phylogenetic trees. Specifically, >10% of initial steps representing poor 
configuration were removed as burn–in. Mean transition rate and the corresponding 
indicator were calculated from the resulting log files. Bayes Factor (BF) support was 
calculated with the indicator to assess statistical support. Significant transition between 
host groups was determined based on the combination of BF >3 and mean indicator >0.5. 
Therefore, support levels were defined as support (3≤BF<10); strong support 
(10≤BF<100); very strong support (100≤BF<1,000); and decisive support (BF≥1,000). 
Phylogenetic Network 
A phylogenetic network was reconstructed using the quartet–based method 
implemented in QuartetMethods (224). A sequence dataset was built by concatenating the 
sequences of six internal genes for 6,693 IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in 
the Americas. The sequences of six internal genes of H7N8 HPAI strain were 
concatenated and the resulting sequence was BLASTed (201) against the dataset. Fifty 
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IAV strains that were most closely related to the H7N8 HPAI stain were selected and 
included in the analysis. 
Genotyping 
Genotypes were defined on the basis of the gene segment–specific phylogenetic 
trees for H7N8 turkey strains and 135 H4N8 IAV strains. A monophyletic clade was 
identified by two criteria: 1) it was supported by a bootstrap value above 70, and 2) all 
sequences in the clade had nucleotide sequence identities >98%, as determined by using 
the hierarchical clustering method implemented in R (https://www.r-project.org/). We 
implemented a stringent cutoff of 98% to identify IAV strains closely related to the H7N8 
turkey strains. The genotype of a genome is the combination of the cluster assignment of 
eight gene segments. 
Results 
H7N8 Virus Originated From IAVs in North American Wild Birds 
To infer the ancestry of each gene segment of the H7N8 viruses detected in 
Indiana turkeys, we first performed preliminary phylogenetic analyses with a collection 
of representative genomic sequences to identify the major genetic lineage to which the 
H7N8 turkey strains belong. Phylogenetic trees support two geographically dependent 
lineages of IAV (North American and Eurasian) for eight gene segments (Figure 12). The 
H7N8 turkey strains were found to share genetic ancestry with IAVs from North America 




Figure 12 Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments of H7N8 
turkey strains and influenza A viruses representing North American and 
Eurasian genetic lineages.  
H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys are indicated by 
red circles. In (h), black bars indicate two alleles for the NS gene segment. 
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We then performed phylogenetic analyses, focusing on genomic sequences of 
IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas. The phylogenetic tree for 
the H7 gene showed that IAV strains from the Americas could be divided into two 
genetic sub–lineages: those from North America and those from South America 
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_IAVs_isolated_from_wild_and_domestic_birds_in_the_America
s.pdf). The South American sub–lineage included H7N3 HPAI viruses isolated during an 
outbreak in Chile in 2002. Three major genetic clusters were identified in the North 
American sub–lineage: cluster I was comprised of viruses isolated from wild and 
domestic birds in North America during the 1970s to the early 1990s; cluster II contained 
H7N2 IAVs isolated from the live–poultry markets in the northeastern United States 
during1994–2006; cluster III represents contemporary H7 IAVs circulating in North 
America, including viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds. The novel H7N8 
turkey strains grouped with H7 viruses in cluster III and were most closely related to IAV 
strains isolated from wild birds 
(Phylogenetic_trees_of_IAVs_isolated_from_wild_and_domestic_birds_in_the_America
s.pdf, Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The H7N3 HPAI 
viruses isolated during three previous outbreaks in North America also grouped with 
contemporary H7 IAVs in cluster III; however, these viruses were associated with 
monophyletic clades divergent from the clade containing H7N8 turkey strains. 
Phylogenetic analyses of the other seven gene segments also showed that the H7N8 
turkey strains clustered with North American wild bird–origin IAV strains and in 




s.pdf, Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). Moreover, in the 
phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments, no poultry–origin IAV gene segments were 
found to be closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains.  
To infer the more detailed evolutionary history of the novel H7N8 viruses, we 
conducted molecular clock analyses for each gene segment using sequences in the clades 
containing the H7N8 turkey strains and those most closely related strains. The resulting 
time–scale maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees were used to identify viruses 
most closely related to H7N8 turkey strains for each gene segment (Figure 13, 
Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The most closely related 
gene segments to H7N8 turkey strains originated from a single isolate, A/Lesser 
scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015(H7N8) (Kentucky/AH0012935), for six gene 
segments (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NA, and NS) (Table 4). This isolate was recovered from a 
sample collected in Kentucky, USA, on November 28, 2015, approximately seven weeks 
before the outbreak and approximately 200 kilometers from the Indiana turkey farm 
where outbreak was detected. The close relatedness between Kentucky/AH0012935 and 
the novel H7N8 HPAI strain in six gene segments was supported by high nucleotide 
sequence identities, ranging from 99.00% (HA gene) to 99.95% (PA gene) (Table 4). The 
NP gene segments of two isolates recovered from samples collected in Ohio, on October 
18, 2014, A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2209/2014(H5N9) (Ohio/14OS2209) and 
A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2210/2014(H5N9) (Ohio/14OS2210), were most closely 
related (98.40% nucleotide sequence identity) to the NP gene of the novel H7N8 HPAI 
strain (Table 4). The MP gene segment of A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3567/2014(H4N8) 
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was most closely related (99.19% nucleotide sequence identity) to that of the H7N8 










































































































































































































































































Table 4 Most closely related genes to eight gene segments of the novel highly 
pathogenic avian influenza strain A/turkey/Indiana/16-001403-
1/2016(H7N8). 
Segment Virus Sequence Identity Subtype Sampling Date 
PB2 A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9987 H7N8 11-28-2015 
PB1 A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9987 H7N8 11-28-2015 
PA A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9995 H7N8 11-28-2015 
HA A/Lessers caup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9900 H7N8 11-28-2015 
NP A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2209/2014 0.9840 H5N9 10-18-2014 A/Northern pintail/Ohio/14OS2210/2014 
NA A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9979 H7N8 11-28-2015 
MP A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3567/2014 0.9919 H4N8 11-15-2014 
NS A/Lesser scaup/Kentucky/AH0012935/2015 0.9952 H7N8 11-28-2015 
 
Three H7N8 turkey strains were estimated to share a common ancestor among 
eight gene segments between March 2015 (MP gene) and December 2015 (HA gene) 
(Figure 14, Table 5). The mean estimated TMRCAs for seven of eight gene segments 
(excluding MP gene) was summer and fall (30 June–4 December) of 2015, which 
overlaps the late breeding and autumn migration period of many wild birds inhabiting 
North America. The HA gene was estimated to have the latest TMRCA (mean December 
4, 2015, 95% highest posterior density [HPD] October 30, 2014–January 4, 2016), which 
is close to the time when Kentucky/AH0012935 was collected. The mean evolutionary 
rate for the H7 gene was estimated to be 6.55 x 10−3 substitutions per site per year (95% 
HPD, 5.74–7.52 x 10−3), which is significantly higher than that for the other seven gene 




Figure 14 Estimated time to most recent common ancestor and nucleotide substitution 
rates for eight gene segments of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys. 
Green circles indicate the estimated mean date (a) or rate (b) and grey bars indicate 95% 
highest posterior density. Blue circles indicate the sample collection time of influenza A 
virus isolate containing the most closely related gene segment to the H7N8 turkey strains. 
Red dash line indicates the sample collection time of the highly pathogenic avian 
influenza H7N8 virus isolated from Indiana turkeys. 
Table 5 Estimated time to most recent common ancestor and nucleotide substitution 
rates for eight gene segments of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys. 
 















PB2 2.99 2.69 3.29  2015-08-22 2015-04-30 2015-11-25 
PB1 3.39 3.03 3.77  2015-09-22 2015-06-21 2015-12-13 
PA 2.66 2.28 3.06  2015-11-06 2015-09-01 2015-12-28 
HA 6.55 5.74 7.52  2015-12-04 2015-10-30 2016-01-04 
NP 2.89 2.53 3.27  2015-08-07 2015-02-28 2015-12-13 
NA 2.28 1.90 2.69  2015-08-27 2015-04-02 2015-12-24 
MP 2.28 1.89 2.70  2015-03-31 2014-06-28 2015-11-13 
NS 2.00 1.56 2.46  2015-06-30 2014-11-30 2015-12-24 
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The sampling time of the most closely related strain for NP gene segment does 
not overlap with the estimated TMRCA (between February 28, 2015 and August 7, 2015) 
(Figure 14, Table 5), suggesting a gap in surveillance and that neither Ohio/14OS2209 
nor Ohio/14OS2210 are the direct predecessor of H7N8 turkey strains. This observation 
is consistent with the genetic distance separating H7N8 turkey strains from other viruses 
in the NP phylogenetic tree 
(Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). 
Gene Constellation of H4N8 Virus in Diving Ducks Contributed to Emergence of 
The Novel H7N8 Virus 
We investigated possible genetic events that contributed to generation of the 
H7N8 precursor virus in wild birds. The phylogenetic network showed that, in addition to 
Kentucky/AH0012935, a group of H4N8 IAVs isolated from diving ducks (referred to as 
H4N8–DD) during 2011–2014 were closely related, across six gene segments, to the 
H7N8 turkey strains (Figure 15). Further examination of the eight gene segment–specific 
phylogenetic trees indicated that the H4N8–DD viruses had five gene segments (PB2, 
PB1, NA, MP, and NS) closely clustered with the H7N8 turkey strains. The NA, MP, and 
NS genes of H4N8–DD viruses consistently formed a monophyletic clade with those of 
the H7N8 turkey strains in phylogenetic trees (Figure 13, 
Time_scale_phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). The PB2 gene of H4N8–
DD viruses isolated in 2014 and that of the H7N8 turkey strains, and PB1 gene of H4N8–
DD viruses isolated in 2012 and 2014 and that of the H7N8 turkey strains were 





Figure 15 Phylogenetic network of H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys in red 
font. 
The network was reconstructed by concatenating sequences of six internal gene segments 
for each virus strain. Strain names are color-coded with the host group colors of Figure 
13. The highly pathogenic H7N8 strain detected in Indiana turkey is marked with an 
asterisk. H4N8 influenza A viruses isolated from diving ducks in 2011, 2012, and 2014 
are indicated by purple, blue, and green shade, respectively. Host species are: AGWT 
(american green winged teal), BUFF (bufflehead), BWTE (blue winged teal), COGO 
(common goldeneye), GRSC (greater scaup), LESC (lesser scaup), MALL (mallard), 
NOSH (northern shoveler), TK (turkey), and WODU (wood duck). Geographic locations 
are: IL (Illinois), IN (Indiana), KY (Kentucky), LA (Louisiana), MN (Minnesota), OH 




To better understand the contribution of H4N8–DD viruses to the generation of 
the H7N8 precursor virus, we assigned genotypes to H4N8 IAVs based on the results of 
phylogenetic analyses. We analyzed the temporal dynamics of gene constellations that 
possessed at least one gene segment that was assigned to the same cluster as a gene 
segment in the H7N8 turkey strains. Gene constellation A possessed three gene segments 
(NA, MP, and NS) that were of the same genotype as those in the H7N8 turkey strains; 
this constellation was first detected at the end of 2011 and persisted for the next three 
years (Figure 16). Gene constellation B possessed the same three H7N8–like gene 
segments as constellation A plus an H7N8–like PB1 gene segment; this constellation was 
first detected at the end of 2012 and continued to exist in H4N8–DD viruses isolated in 
2014. Gene constellation C possessed five H7N8–like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA, 
MP, and NS) and was first detected in late 2014. The close genetic relationship between 
H4N8–DD viruses and the H7N8 HPAI turkey strain at these five gene segments was 
supported by high nucleotide sequence identities (>99.00%) (Table 6). Taken together, 
these results provide evidence that gene constellations of H4N8 IAVs isolated primarily 
from diving ducks contributed to the generation of a H7N8 precursor virus in wild birds. 
Furthermore, a relatively persistent gene constellation possessing H7N8–like gene 
segments emerged in or before 2011 and apparently acquired additional gene segments 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IAVs From Diving Ducks Are The Probable Genetic Source of The H7N8 Virus in 
Indiana Turkeys. 
Our phylogenetic and genotyping analyses provided evidence that IAVs isolated 
from diving ducks may have contributed to the generation of the H7N8 virus that was 
detected in Indiana turkeys. Using discrete phylogeographic analyses, we sought to 
further understand if diving ducks were the most likely source of H7N8 turkey strains. 
Results showed significant diffusion pathways from diving ducks to domestic turkey 
flocks in Indiana for seven gene segments: transition with decisive support was observed 
for the NS gene segment; strongly supported transition was observed for the PB2, PB1, 
HA, and NA gene segments; and supported transition was observed for the PA and MP 
gene segments (Figure 17, Table 7, Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). 
No significant transition for NP gene segment was observed between any wild bird 
species and Indiana turkeys (Figure 17, Table 7, 
Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf). In total, the resulting transition 
patterns suggested IAV gene flow from diving ducks to Indiana turkeys and provide 
evidence that IAVs from diving ducks were the most likely genetic source of the H7N8 
virus that was detected in turkeys in Indiana. 
To gain insight into the gene flow pattern of IAVs among various wild bird 
species, we examined the diffusion pathways among different host groups. Bidirectional 
transmission was observed between dabbling duck and diving duck, and between 
gull/tern and shorebird; and gene transmission from diving duck to goose/swan was also 
observed (Table 8), suggesting extensive mixing of IAVs between these bird species 




Figure 17 Diffusion of influenza A virus between different host groups of wild birds 








Figure 17 (continued) 
(a) – (h) are maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees for eight gene segments. The 
trees are constructed on the basis of the maximum clade credibility phylogenetic trees 
shown in Phylogenetic_trees_for_eight_gene_segments.pdf. (I) summarizes the diffusion 
pathway of influenza A virus between diving duck and Indiana turkey. 
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Table 7 Diffusion pathway of influenza A virus between wild birds and Indian 
turkeys. 
Segment Host group Transition rate Indicator Bayes factor Support level 
PB2 Diving duck 0.70 0.82 24.12 Strong support 
PB1 Diving duck 0.57 0.73 14.39 Strong support 
PA Diving duck 0.73 0.65 9.99 Support 
HA Diving duck 0.93 0.80 24.81 Strong support 
NP No significant transition was observed 
NA Diving duck 0.44 0.92 37.89 Strong support 
MP Diving duck 0.68 0.55 3.91 Support 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































H7N8 LPAI Virus Evolved Into An HPAI Strain In Turkeys 
We also investigated how the H7N8 virus evolved into a highly pathogenic form 
after its introduction into domestic turkeys. The cleavability of HA protein is considered 
a major determinant of pathogenicity, although the pathogenicity of IAVs is polygenic. 
We investigated the sequence in the cleavage region of the HA protein of H7N8 turkey 
strains. Indiana/16-001403-1 has a three basic amino acids (KRK) insert at the cleavage 
site that results in a protein sequence motif: PENPKKRKTRGLF (Figure 18). The other 
two H7N8 turkey strains, Indiana/16-001573-2 and Indiana/16-001574-7, have an 
identical and typical LPAI cleavage site with no insert. Analyses of H7 HPAI strains 
from previous outbreaks in the Americas identified multiple insertion patterns and 
insertions of six to ten amino acids (Figure 18). Comparison showed that the novel H7N8 
HPAI strain has a unique cleavage site different from earlier H7 HPAI strains in the 
Americas. 
Comparison of the genome of H7N8 HPAI strain and those of the two H7N8 
LPAI turkey strains identified five amino acid substitutions in five distinct proteins 
(Figure 19). Moreover, five amino acid substitutions in three different proteins were 
detected between the genome of three H7N8 turkey strains and that of 
Kentucky/AH0012935 (Figure 19). The profile of three amino acid positions (E105K, 
F260L, and E278K [H3 numbering]; 95, 251, and 269 [H7 numbering]) in the HA1 
protein were analyzed for all H7 IAVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in the 
influenza database. It is interesting that amino acid K at position 278 [H3 numbering] in 
the HA1 protein was observed in one poultry–origin isolate, 
A/chicken/Guanajuato/07437-15/2015(H7N3), which presents multiple basic amino acids 
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in the HA protein cleavage region. Amino acid K was also observed in six H7N3 HPAI 
strains isolated during an outbreak in Pakistan in 2004. These amino acid substitutions 
were potentially linked to the host adaptation of H7N8 viruses from wild waterfowl to 
turkey and evolution from low pathogenic to highly pathogenic form.  
 
Figure 18 Insertion patterns in the HA cleavage region of the H7 viruses detected in 
Indiana turkeys and those from four previous outbreaks in the Americas. 
The H7N8 viruses detected in Indiana turkeys are indicated in red, highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses isolated from previous outbreaks are indicated in green. Wild 
bird-origin influenza A viruses containing HA gene segment that is most closely related 
to outbreak strains are indicated in black. Insert of basic amino acids are color-coded 
accordingly. Host species are: BWTE (blue winged teal), CITE (cinnamon teal), CK 
(chicken), GADW (gadwall), LESC (lesser scaup), REDH (redhead), and TK (turkey). 
Geographic locations are: AZ (Arizona), BC (British Columbia), IN (Indiana), KY 




Figure 19 Amino acid substitutions among eight gene segments of the H7N8 strains 
detected in Indiana turkey. 
The position of amino acid substitution between Kentucky/AH0012935 and the H7N8 
turkey strains are shown in bold, and other positions represent amino acid substitutions 
between the highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N8 strain and two low pathogenic 
avian influenza H7N8 strains associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys. 
Amino acids are colored-coded on the basis of Rasmol coloring scheme in CLC sequence 
Viewer 7, and colors represent the different properties of amino acids. Host species are:  
LESC (lesser scaup) and TK (turkey). Geographic locations are: IN (Indiana) and KY 
(Kentucky). 
Discussion 
Introduction of IAVs from wild birds to domestic poultry presents a continuous 
threat to livestock health. In this study, we provided evidence that the H7N8 virus 
associated with the outbreak of disease in Indiana turkeys was generated through a series 
of genetic events likely occurring in wild birds and subsequently introduced into an 
Indiana turkey flock, where the virus evolved into a highly pathogenic form. 
We propose one possible evolutionary model leading to the generation of H7N8 
HPAI virus in Indiana turkeys on the basis of available evidence and emphasize that other 
models cannot be excluded. The H7N8 precursor virus may have been generated in wild 
birds through two phase sequential reassortment events (Figure 20). The first phase of 
reassortment may have occurred between H4N8–DD viruses and other IAVs circulating 
in North American wild birds during 2011–2014, generating 
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A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3609/2014–like virus, possessing five H7N8–like gene 
segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS), in diving ducks. In the second phase, further 
reassortment between A/Bufflehead/Illinois/14OS3609/2014–like virus and locally 
circulating IAVs in wild birds that have H7N8–like PA, HA, and NP gene segments lead 
to the generation of H7N8 precursor virus. Although the direct predecessor virus of the 
H7N8 turkey viruses could not be identified, we identified one IAV strain that possess six 
gene segments most closely related to that of the H7N8 HPAI virus, with nucleotide 
sequence identity ≥99.00%, in a diving duck sampled in Kentucky. IAVs that are most 
closely related to the H7N8 turkey strains, including Kentucky/AH0012935 and H4N8–
DD isolates, were mainly recovered from samples collected in Kentucky, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Ohio, and Louisiana, all of which are included within the Mississippi flyway. In 
addition, sample collection sites for IAVs isolated from diving ducks included locations 
within all four major flyways of North America (Figure 21). Thus, we predict that the 
reassortment events leading to the generation of H7N8 precursor viruses likely occurred 
within the Mississippi flyway. Regarding the time of introduction of H7N8 virus to 
Indiana turkeys, we observed that the TMRCAs for three H7N8 turkey strains among 
seven of eight gene segments were summer and fall of 2015. In North America, 
waterfowl generally begin staging for autumn migration in July and August. Southern 
migration begins as early as August for blue-winged teal and for most waterfowl in late 
September, October, and early November. It was likely that waterfowl, including diving 
ducks, may have carried the H7N8 precursor virus during their southern migration and 
introduced this virus to Indiana turkeys through an unidentified interface between wild 
waterfowl and domestic poultry. After introduction to Indiana turkeys, H7N8 LPAI virus 
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evolved into highly pathogenic form through acquisition of three basic amino acids 































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 21 Statistics of influenza A viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds in the 
Americas. 
(a) Distribution of 8,845 influenza A virus strains isolated from wild and domestic birds 
in the Americas among different bird groups.  (b) Distribution of 133 influenza A virus 
strains isolated from American diving ducks among four bird migratory flyways and 
South America. (c) Distribution of 133 influenza A virus strains isolated from American 
diving ducks among different sampling years. 
Worldwide, LPAI viruses have been recovered from at least 105 wild bird species 
representing 26 different taxonomic families (33). Most of the 26 families are in the 
Order Anseriformes (including ducks, geese, and swans), followed by the Order 
Charadriiformes (including shorebirds and gulls); both are considered major natural 
reservoirs for IAVs (4). Among these bird species, shorebirds and gulls were previously 
suggested to be the source of the precursor of H5 and H7 HPAI viruses in North America 
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(225). A more recent study indicated that the precursors of H7N3 HPAI viruses in the 
Americas most likely originated from wild waterfowl, particularly dabbling ducks (194). 
In Eurasia, precursors of H7 HPAI viruses were generally found in dabbling ducks (195). 
Our findings add to the knowledge supporting that introduction of IAVs from wild birds 
plays an important role in the emergence of IAVs in domestic poultry. This study differs 
from previous work, though, in providing evidence that diving ducks may also contribute 
to the emergence of a HPAI strain as compared to dabbling ducks, shorebirds and gulls, 
and other bird species. Diving ducks appeared to have contributed five gene segments 
(PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS) to the novel H7N8 virus, may have harbored the H7N8 
LPAI precursor virus; however, the mechanism of exposure to Indiana turkeys remains 
unclear. The behavior of diving ducks may contribute to the long-term perpetuation of 
specific IAV genes or strains. Compared with dabbling ducks and many other birds, 
diving ducks utilize open water habitats that can include deeper water. It has been shown 
that IAVs may remain infectious in water for several months (41), but infectivity is 
adversely affected by repeated freeze-thaw cycles that would be more likely to occur at 
the shallower water utilized by dabbling ducks (226). In aquatic habitats highly 
contaminated by waterfowl feces, deeper water habitats that undergo limited or no freeze-
thaw cycles could also increase the risk for IAV co-infection, which could lead to virus 
reassortment and the generation of novel IAV strains as occurred with the H7N8 
precursor viruses. 
Mutation and reassortment have been two major mechanisms for IAVs to 
maintain circulation and expand host ranges. Reassortment events have been well 
documented for IAVs that infect humans, swine, equine, canines, and wild and domestic 
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birds. Persistence of a gene constellation has been shown to be associated with 
emergence of novel IAV strains that infect mammals. The existence of triple-reassortant 
internal gene constellations has been well established in multiple subtypes of IAVs that 
infect swine, and such constellations contributed to the genesis of the pandemic influenza 
A(H1N1) pdm09 virus (95). This internal gene constellation was suggested to possess a 
selective advantage over other strains (227). In contrast, IAVs that infect wild birds 
generally form diverse and transient genotypes through reassortment of functionally 
equivalent gene segments (48). Specific studies devoted to H7 IAVs in wild birds 
inhabiting North America and Eurasia found similar patterns (196, 219). In addition, 
extensive gene flow between IAVs in North American wild birds could further facilitate 
genetic diversity, although the migratory flyway and geographic distance may impose 
short-term restrictions on gene flow (228, 229). We observed that as many as five H7N8–
like gene segments (PB2, PB1, NA, MP, and NS) formed a relatively persistent gene 
constellation in H4N8 IAVs isolated from diving ducks. This finding suggests that 
reassortment between IAVs in wild birds may not be random: some gene segments may 
be more likely to form specific linkages within the context of diverse and transient 
genotypes. Alternatively, reassortment may be restricted in some groups of birds, like 
diving ducks, if prevalence and the probability of infection with two or more viruses is 
unlikely. The significance of the relatively persistent gene constellation, within the 
context of transient genotypes of IAVs in wild birds, observed in this study is not known. 
Influenza surveillance in wild birds is critical for understanding the natural history 
of IAVs and assessing the ancestry of IAVs infecting domestic poultry, however, the 
existing surveillance system in wild birds could have led to considerable bias toward bird 
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species that are present in large numbers in nature or that are easily caught (33). Diving 
ducks are underrepresented in both historic and current IAV surveillance. We 
investigated the host origin of genomic sequences deposited in the Influenza Research 
Database (220) and found that diving duck-origin strains comprise around 1.50% of the 
total number of IAV strains isolated from wild and domestic birds in the Americas 
(Figure 21). Among the 441 IAV strains that we sequenced in this study, only six 
originated from diving ducks (Figure 11). In addition, data from a large scale surveillance 
program in wild birds throughout the United States showed that, among the 197,885 
samples collected from over 200 wild bird species (2007–2011), diving ducks accounted 
for only 7.72% of all samples collected and 3.58% of the IAV positive samples 
determined by M gene based rRT-PCR; dabbling ducks accounted for 62.73% of the 
samples collected and 86.44% of the IAV positive samples (230). Although data from the 
same study showed that the IAV positive rate for diving ducks was 5.30% compared to 
15.80% for dabbling ducks, our study highlights the contribution of diving ducks to the 
emergence of the novel H7N8 virus and suggests that diving ducks may serve as a 
potentially unique IAV reservoir or uniquely contribute to the maintenance, 
diversification, and transmission of IAVs in wild birds. Thus, we recommend additional 
surveillance sampling of diving ducks and other bird species of specific ecological 
significance for IAVs, but acknowledge the difficulty in obtaining these samples from 
hunter harvested birds since dabblers are usually the preferred bird species of hunters. 
Moreover, we observed a relatively persistent gene constellation that may be associated 
with the emergence of the novel H7N8 virus. Genome sequencing and characterization of 
gene constellation of IAVs in wild birds could serve as a valuable component of a 
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successful surveillance strategy. The genomes of 441 wild bird–origin IAVs were 
sequenced in a collaborative effort in this study. This large number of IAV isolates and 
sequences enabled us to conduct detailed evolutionary analyses and revealed a few key 
aspects regarding the evolutionary pathway leading to the novel H7N8 virus. The 
experience from this study demonstrates the need for a coordinated, systematic, and 
collaborative approach to active surveillance in wild birds. 
In summary, our investigation provides information on the putative viral 
ancestors, possible evolutionary pathways, and probable host species involved in the 
emergence of a novel H7N8 virus that caused outbreaks among turkey flocks in Indiana 
during 2016. Our findings indicate that diving ducks contributed to the emergence of the 
novel H7N8 virus and may contribute to the maintenance, diversification, and 
transmission of IAVs in wild birds. The repeated introduction of IAVs into domestic 
poultry from wild birds highlights important gaps in existing biosecurity systems and 
provides evidence that surveillance in wild birds can be useful for understanding possible 




THE ANTIGENIC DIVERSITY AND GENETIC EVOLUTION OF 
CONTEMPORARY H7 AIVS FROM NORTH AMERICA  
DURING 1971 to 2012 
H7 AIVs have caused at least 500 confirmed human infections since 2003 and 
culling of more than 75 million birds in recent years. Vaccine could serve as a valuable 
component in a successful AIV control strategy, and antigenic match between vaccine 
seed strain and circulating viral strains is one of the keys to a successful vaccination 
program. However, limited data is available for the antigenic diversity of contemporary 
H7 AIVs from North America. In this chapter, we antigenically and genetically 
characterized 93 AIV isolates from North America (85 from wild birds [1976–2010], 
seven from domestic poultry [1971–2012], and one from a seal [1980]). The 
hemagglutinin genes of these H7 viruses are separated from those from Eurasia. Gradual 
accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions was observed in the 
hemagglutinin of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds. Genotype 
characterization suggested that H7 AIVs circulating in North American wild birds form 
diverse and transient internal gene constellations. Serologic analyses showed that the 93 
isolates cross-reacted with each other to different extents. Antigenic cartography showed 
that the average antigenic distance among them was 1.14 units (standard deviation [SD], 
0.57 unit) and that antigenic diversity among the H7 isolates we tested was limited. Our 
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results suggest that the continuous genetic evolution has not led to significant antigenic 
diversity for H7 AIVs from North America. These findings add to our understanding of 
the natural history of IAVs and will inform public health decision-making regarding the 
threat these viruses pose to humans and poultry. 
Introduction 
H7 AIVs have been frequently reported to cause outbreaks in domestic poultry 
and humans. The first outbreak of HPAI H7 virus in Pakistan was reported in 1995, and 
the threat to domestic poultry has persisted in the region since then (231, 232). In 2003, a 
HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands led to the death or culling of more than 
30,000,000 birds and 89 infections in humans, one of which was fatal (19, 233). In March 
2013, a LPAI H7N9 virus emerged in eastern China (177) and has become enzootic in the 
region (234). The virus causes asymptomatic infection in domestic poultry, including 
chickens and waterfowl, but high morbidity and mortality in human infections (235). 
Since the emergence of H7N9 virus, more than 500 laboratory-confirmed cases in human 
have been reported, of which more than 100 were fatal 
(http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). 
Furthermore, epidemics caused by H7N1 and H7N3 AIVs were reported in Italy during 
1999–2004 (150, 189). H7 AIVs were also reported to cause outbreaks in domestic 
poultry in Australia (236), Germany (237), and the United Kingdom (238). In North 
America, H7N2 AIV was first identified in 1994 in the LPM system in the northeastern 
United States, and during 1997–2002 it was linked with outbreaks among poultry in 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina(129, 181). HPAI H7N3 
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viruses were responsible for outbreaks in poultry in Canada (in 2004 and 2007) and 
Mexico (in 2012) (61, 239, 240), and subsequently spilled over to humans (64, 241). 
The conventional strategy for controlling the spread of avian influenza outbreaks 
in domestic poultry involves enforcement of biosecurity measures, diagnostics and 
surveillance, and culling of infected birds. In addition, vaccination programs have been 
implemented in multiple countries to control H7 AIV outbreaks among domestic poultry. 
For example, in Italy, vaccine was used against H7N1 virus in 2000 and against H7N3 
virus in 2002; vaccines have been used in Pakistan since 1995 to control H7N3 virus; and 
in North America, vaccine was used against a 2003 H7N2 virus outbreak in Connecticut, 
United States, and against the on-going H7N3 virus outbreak in Mexico. Early experience 
showed that vaccine could serve as a valuable component in a successful AIV control 
strategy. 
IAVs evolve by two major mechanisms: mutation and reassortment. Point 
mutations within surface glycoproteins HA and NA can lead to a small antigenic change, 
so called antigenic drift. Reassortment refers to the exchange of individual gene segments 
or combinations of segments between IAVs during mixed infections in the same cell. The 
switch of HA and/or NA by reassortment can cause a large antigenic change, so called 
antigenic shift. Reassortment occurs frequently between IAVs, and it facilitates 
generation of epidemic and pandemic influenza strains. Both antigenic drift and antigenic 
shift allow IAVs to evade the herd immunity established from previous influenza 
infections or vaccination. 
Earlier studies have showed minor antigenic diversity for wild bird-origin H7 
AIVs from Eurasia (195, 196); however, limited data is available for antigenic diversity 
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of contemporary H7 AIVs from North America. Understanding the antigenic diversity of 
H7 AIVs circulating in North America will facilitate the detection of antigenic variants 
and development of effective strategies for disease prevention and control. In this 
chapter, we antigenically characterized 93 H7 AIVs derived from wild waterfowl, 
domestic poultry, and a seal; the isolates were collected across North America during 
1971–2012. The genomic sequences were analyzed to determine the genetic evolution 
dynamics of H7 AIVs in North America. 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement 
All experiments involved in animals were approved by Institutional Animal Care 
& Use Committee, Mississippi State University (Project No. 13-090). All experiments 
were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. 
Viruses 
A total of 93 H7 isolates were included in the study (Table 9): 85 were derived 
from wild birds during 1976-2010, seven were derived from domestic poultry during 
1971-2012, and one was derived from a seal in 1980. Among these isolates, A/cinnamon 
teal/Mexico/2817/2006(H7N3) was the vaccine strain used during the vaccination 
campaign against HPAI H7N3 virus in Mexico in 2012, strain A/chicken/British 
Columbia/314514-2/2004(H7N3) was isolated from the outbreak in domestic poultry in 
Canada in 2004, and strain A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012(H7N3) was from the 
outbreak in Mexico in 2012. The wild bird-origin isolates represent those recovered from 
Canada, Mexico, and 28 states within the United States. They also represent the four 
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major bird migratory flyways in North America: the Atlantic, Central, Mississippi, and 
Pacific flyway (Figure 22). 
The isolates were propagated by using nine day old specific pathogen free chicken 
embryonated eggs; the eggs were inoculated and incubated for 72 hours at 37°C before 
the virus was harvested. Viruses were then aliquoted and stored at −80°C until use. 
Generation of Reference Antisera in Chicken 
A total of 15 H7 isolates were selected to generate reference antisera; the isolates 
were selected to maximize the representative subtype and species diversity and 
geographic and temporal coverage of the 93 isolates (Table 9). Three-week-old specific 
pathogen free chickens were used to produce antisera. Chickens were inoculated 
intranasally with 106 50% tissue culture infective doses of an H7 AIV isolate. If the sera 
titers were ≥ 1:160 at two weeks post inoculation, the sera were collected at three weeks 
post inoculation; if the viral titers were < 1:160 at two weeks post inoculation, the birds 
were re-inoculated intranasally with 106 50% tissue culture infective doses of the same 
H7 AIV isolate and the sera were collected at two weeks post re-inoculation. Blood was 
collected from the chickens’ heart four weeks after the first inoculation. Serum was 
separated from the erythrocytes after centrifugation at 2,000 rpm for ten minutes. All sera 
were aliquoted and stored at −80°C until use. 
HA and HI Assays 
Before performing the HI tests, we treated the chicken antisera with 100% packed 
chicken red blood cells to eliminate non-specific antigen reactions. The HA and HI 
assays were performed in accordance with World Organisation for Animal Health 
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guidelines. HI tests were carried out by using four hemagglutinin units and a 1% chicken 
red blood cells suspension. 
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collected Flyway Subtype 
Isolates from wild birds    
A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00551331/2007a 10-Nov-07 Central H7N3 
A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00374996/2007 15-Dec-07 Pacific H7N3 
A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140912/2008 9-Jul-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140913/2008 9-Jul-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/domestic duck/West Virginia/A00140915/2008 9-Jul-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325105/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325108/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325112/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325114/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325115/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325117/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325125/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325129/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mute swan/Rhode Island/A00325136/2008 6-Aug-08 Atlantic H7N3 
A/mallard/Wisconsin/A00465618/2008 5-Sep-08 Mississippi H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624483/2008 8-Sep-08 Mississippi H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/Missouri/A00624484/2008 8-Sep-08 Mississippi H7N3 
A/mallard/Iowa/A00558620/2008 18-Oct-08 Mississippi H7N3 
A/American green-winged teal/Colorado/A00660616/2008 9-Nov-08 Central H7N3 





Table 9 (continued) 
Virus 
Date 
collected Flyway Subtype 
Isolates from wild birds    
 A/mallard/New Jersey/A00122457/2008 22-Nov-08 Atlantic H7N8 
 A/mallard/Kansas/A00523306/2008 25-Nov-08 Central H7N3 
 A/mallard/Indiana/A00142205/2008 26-Nov-08 Mississippi H7N3 
 A/northern shoveler/Nevada/A00505416/2008 6-Dec-08 Pacific H7N6 
 A/American green-winged 
 teal/Wyoming/A00230796/2008 
7-Dec-08 Central H7N3 
 A/bufflehead/Virginia/A00120022/2008 9-Dec-08 Atlantic H7N2 
 A/northern shoveler/Oregon/A00654616/2008 22-Dec-08 Pacific H7N3 
 A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00682947/2008 27-Dec-08 Mississippi H7N7 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00833077/2009 2-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115994/2009 3-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Arizona/A00115995/2009 3-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00831743/2009 3-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/gadwall/Arizona/A00663934/2009 3-Jan-09 Pacific H7N7 
 A/northern shoveler/Mississippi/A00602284/2009 3-Jan-09 Mississippi H7N2,N7 
 A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00831758/2009 8-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00654391/2009 9-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461135/2009 15-Jan-09 Pacific H7N1 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00461136/2009 15-Jan-09 Pacific H7N1 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00614935/2009 15-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 





Table 9 (continued) 
Virus 
Date 
collected Flyway Subtype 
Isolates from wild birds    
 A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00449455/2009 15-Jan-09 Central H7N3 
 A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00461133/2009 15-Jan-09 Pacific H7N4 
 A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468752/2009 15-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/American green-winged teal/Utah/A00468772/2009 16-Jan-09 Pacific H7N7 
 A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468715/2009 16-Jan-09 Pacific H7N6 
 A/northern shoveler/Utah/A00468766/2009 16-Jan-09 Pacific H7N3 
 A/northern pintail/Texas/A00466052/2009 18-Jan-09 Central H7N3 
 A/ring-necked duck/Texas/A00766403/2009 19-Jan-09 Central H7N1 
 A/blue-winged teal/Louisiana/A00637297/2009 22-Jan-09 Mississippi H7N3 
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604024/2009 3-Feb-09 Central H7N3 
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604029/2009 3-Feb-09 Central H7N3 
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604032/2009 3-Feb-09 Central H7N3 
A/American green-winged teal/Texas/A00604814/2009 3-Feb-09 Central H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00605473/2009 13-Mar-09 Central H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/Minnesota/A00137660/2009 27-Jul-09 Mississippi H7N3 
A/mallard/Montana/A00750842/2009 16-Sep-09 Central H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/South Dakota/A00772794/2009 28-Sep-09 Central H7N7 
A/mallard/Michigan/A00869519/2009 14-Oct-09 Mississippi H7N3 
A/mallard/Nebraska/A00709657/2009 28-Nov-09 Central H7N3 
A/mallard/New York/A00723392/2009 12-Dec-09 Atlantic H7N3 





Table 9 (continued) 
Virus 
Date 
collected Flyway Subtype 
Isolates from wild birds    
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00749161/2009 12-Dec-09 Central H7N3 
A/mallard/Oklahoma/A00744383/2009 13-Dec-09 Central H7N3 
A/northern shoveler/Oklahoma/A00744384/2009 13-Dec-09 Central H7N3 
A/mallard/Illinois/A00325439/2009 18-Dec-09 Mississippi H7N3 
A/mallard/Illinois/A00755320/2009 18-Dec-09 Mississippi H7N3 
A/mallard/New Jersey/A00926089/2010 17-Feb-10 Atlantic H7N3 
A/American black duck/Delaware/A00870108/2010 18-Feb-10 Atlantic H7N3 
A/blue-winged teal/Texas/A00463679/2010 10-Mar-10 Central H7N3 
A/duck/Alberta/49/1976 1976  H7N3 
A/mallard/Ohio/421/1987 1987  H7N8 
A/pintail/MN/423/1999 1999  H7N3 
A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000 2000  H7N3 
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/1538/2000 2000  H7N9 
A/ruddy turnstone/DE/892/2006 2002  H7N3 
A/cinnamon teal/Mexico/2817/2006 2006  H7N3 
A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/207/2006  2006  H7N3 
Isolates from domestic poultry    
A/turkey/Oregon/1971 1971  H7N3 
A/turkey/MN/38429/1988 1988  H7N9 
A/turkey/NY/4450-4/1994 1994  H7N2 
A/turkey/VA/SEP-67/2002 2002  H7N2 
A/chicken/CT/260413-2/2003 2003  H7N2 
A/chicken/British Columbia/314514-2/2004b 2004  H7N3 
A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA-12283/2012b 2012  H7N3 
Isolate from seal    
A/seal/MA/1/1980 1980  H7N7 
a Viruses used to generated reference antisera are in bold. 
b Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. 
Isolates’ name was colored-coded according to their genetic clusters. Red indicates virus 




Figure 22 Geographic distribution of H7 AIVs selected for antigenic characterization. 
The isolates represent strains from Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Triangles 
indicate viruses isolated from wild birds, dots indicate viruses isolated from domestic 
poultry, and the square indicates virus isolated from a seal. Map of North America with 




Full Genome Sequencing 
Viral RNA was extracted from the allantoic fluid of specific pathogen free 
embryonated chicken eggs by using the QIAamp Viral RNA Kit (QIAGEN, Valencia, 
CA) according to the manufacturer’s instructions. The full-length cDNA for eight 
influenza gene segments was amplified by using a SuperScript One-Step RT-PCR kit 
(Invitrogen, Grand Island, NY) with influenza virus–specific primers (242). PCR 
products were separated by using agarose gel electrophoresis and purified by using a 
QIAquick Gel Purification Kit (QIAGEN). Amplified viral DNA products were 
quantitated by using a High Sensitivity DNA kit on an Agilent 2100 Bioanalyzer system 
(both from Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA). An equal amount of each sample was 
used to prepare the sequencing library with the Illumina Nextera DNA Sample 
Preparation Kit (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA). Library samples were further 
quantitated, normalized, and pooled together. Pooled library samples were sequenced by 
using a MiSeq Reagent Kit v2 (500 cycles) on a MiSeq sequencer (Illumina); the 
sequencing protocol suggested by the manufacturer was followed. When any gene 
segment presented more than one copy of sequence, PCR was performed with 
specifically designed primer to confirm the existence of multiple copies of sequences. 
These sequences were excluded from further analysis. Sequences obtained in this study 
are available in GenBank under accession numbers KU289738 to KU290331. 
Genomic Assembly 
Genomic assembly was conducted with the in-house influenza genome assembly 
pipeline, which integrates quality trimming by Trimmomatic (198), de novo assembly by 
Velvet (200), reference search by BLAST (201), and mapping by Bowtie v2.0 (199). In 
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brief, quality trimming was first conducted by using Trimmomatic, which trims bases 
from both ends of each read if the quality falls below 30 and clips reads if the average 
quality drops below 28 (in a sliding window of ten bases). Reads less than 100 
nucleotides in length were not included in the downstream analyses. The quality-filtered 
reads were then de novo assembled in Velvet to build long contigs, and resulting contigs 
were searched against the Influenza Virus Resource (243) by using BLAST to select the 
reference sequence. Quality-filtered reads were then mapped to the reference sequences 
by using Bowtie v2.0. Last, consensus sequences were generated with a minimum 10-
fold mapping coverage and supported by at least 90% of reads at a given position. The 
mapping profile was visualized by using the Integrative Genomics Viewer (244) and 
manually checked to correct potential assembly errors. 
Evolutionary Analysis 
Phylogenetic trees were inferred by using the maximum likelihood method 
implemented in RAxML v8.1.17 (245). A general time-reversible model of nucleotide 
substitution and a γ-distributed rate variation among sites was applied throughout the 
analysis. Sequence alignments were conducted by using MUSCLE v3.8 (222). 
To understand the evolutionary history of the H7 gene of AIVs isolated from 
North America, two rounds of phylogenetic analyses were conducted. In the first round, 
all genomic sequences of the H7 gene from AIVs were downloaded from the Influenza 
Virus Resource in March 2015. A total of 1,315 sequences were available after 
combining these database sequences with sequences recovered in this study. Two major 
lineages, North American and Eurasian, were identified from the topology of this 
preliminary phylogeny. Sequences falling into the North American lineage were kept, 
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and 19 sequences were selected to represent the Eurasian lineage. After that, 775 
sequences were retained. In the second round, phylogenetic analysis was conducted on 
the HA1 domain of these 775 nucleotide sequences for a clear comparison of the 
antigenic and genetic profiles. Topological robustness of the tree was evaluated by 1,000 
pseudo-replicates. 
Two rounds of phylogenetic analysis were conducted to assess the evolutionary 
history of the six internal gene segments of H7 AIVs circulating among wild birds in 
North America. In the first round, 8,545 genomic sequences from 1,030 complete 
genomes of H7 AIVs were downloaded from the Influenza Virus Resource. When 
multiple copies of genomic sequences were present for one gene segment, the sequence 
corresponding to the maximal length was reserved. These database sequences were 
analyzed with complete genomes recovered in this study. A total of 1,098 complete 
genomes were retained, and phylogenetic tree was inferred for each gene segment. 
Topology of the phylogeny was supported by 100 pseudo-replicates. North American and 
Eurasian lineages were identified from the tree topology. In the second round of analysis, 
the phylogenetic tree was inferred for 316 complete genomes corresponding to wild bird–
origin isolates in the North American NA-WB lineage. Topology of the phylogeny was 
supported by 1,000 pseudo-replicates. Genotypes were defined on the basis of the 
phylogenetic tree of each gene segment. A monophyletic clade was identified by two 
criteria: (1) it was supported by a bootstrap value above 60, and (2) all sequences in the 
clade had an average genetic distance greater than 95%. 
The extent of reassortment among the internal gene segments was determined on 
the basis of the six gene segment phylogenetic trees for viruses in the NA-WB lineage. A 
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maximum likelihood method was implemented to measure the congruence among these 
trees. Each gene segment tree was fitted to six gene data sets in turn, and the log 
likelihood value was obtained after optimizing model parameters and branch lengths. The 
similarity in topology among six gene trees corresponding to the same dataset was 
determined by the difference in log likelihood values. To put the distribution of log 
likelihood value in context, 100 random trees were generated for each gene dataset. Log 
likelihood values were obtained, using the same approach, after fitting them to the 
reference gene dataset. 
Inference of Amino Acid Sites under Positive Selection 
Selection pressure for the HA gene segment was investigated by using codon 
substitution models implemented in the Codeml program of PAML v 4.8 (246). The site 
models were used, allowing the ratio of non-synonymous/synonymous substitution rates 
(dN/dS) to vary among sites. Four different models were used: M1a, M2a, M7, and M8. 
Likelihood ratio tests for two pairs of models (M2a versus M1a and M8 versus M7) were 
conducted according to instructions in the manual. In the test, twice the log likelihood 
difference between the alternative model and null model was calculated. Small p-values 
(<0.01) lead to rejection of the null models. If null models were rejected, then Bayes 
Empirical Bayes analysis was implemented for estimation of specific codons under 
positive selection. Before analysis, identical sequences and sequences with ambiguous 





Molecular dating was conducted by using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo method implemented in BEAST v1.8.0 (223). A HKY85 nucleotide substitution 
model, Bayesian skyline coalescent tree prior, and relaxed uncorrelated lognormal clock 
model were applied. For each analysis, a chain length of 50 million steps was run and 
2,000 samples were generated. The results were analyzed in Tracer v1.6 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tracer/), and convergence was assessed with a cutoff of 
200 for the effective sample size. The mean nucleotide substitution rate and time to the 
most common ancestor were computed after 10% of the samples were removed as burn-
in, and the statistical uncertainty was evaluated by using the values of the 95% HPD. 
Construction of the Antigenic Cartography and Molecular Characterization 
Antigenic cartography was constructed on the basis of HI data by using 
AntigenMap (247). Each entry in the HI table was normalized by dividing the maximum 
HI value for the reference antiserum. Missing HI titers and those below the cutoff value 
for low reactors were analyzed by low-rank matrix completion. An HI titer of ten was 
used as the low-reactor cutoff in the HI assay. Antigenic distance between two antigens 
was defined as the Euclidean distance between the HI values of the two viruses against 
all the antisera. Each unit of the antigenic distance corresponded to a 2-fold change in HI 
titer. Multidimensional scaling was used to project viruses to a 2-dimensional map by 
minimizing the sum-squared error between map distance and antigenic distance. 
Antigenic distance was subjected to hierarchical clustering analysis implemented in R 
(https://www.r-project.org/) to determine the potential division of viruses. 
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To investigate the difference in antibody binding site within the HA sequences, 
the protein sequences of these isolates were aligned with the H3 protein sequences and 
the antibody binding sites were annotated based on those in H3N2 influenza A virus as 
shown previously (169). 135 amino acid positions corresponding to five antibody binding 
sites A, B, C, D, and E in the H3 protein were identified. 
Results 
H7 HA Genes are Genetically Diverse 
Phylogenetic analyses showed that HA gene of H7 AIVs was divided into two 
geographically dependent lineages: Eurasian and North American (Figure 23, 
Phylogenetic_tree_for_HA1_nucleotide_sequences_of_H7_AIVs.pdf). Sporadic 
intercontinental gene flow between these two genetic pools was observed. Five H7 
viruses isolated in North America fell into the Eurasian lineage, and at least two 
independent introductions (in 1992 and 1994) were identified. AIVs 
A/softbill/CA/33445-158/1992(H7N1) and A/softbill/California/33445-136/1992(H7N1) 
were most closely related to A/non-psittacine/England-Q/1985/89(H7N7), sharing 
nucleotide sequence identities of 96.3% and 96.4%, respectively. In addition, 
A/softbill/California/13907-21/1994(H7N1) and A/Pekin 
robin/California/30412/1994(H7N1) are closely related to a group of AIVs of the same 
subtype isolated from wild birds in the Netherlands, Singapore, and England in 1994; 
nucleotide sequence identities ranged from 97.8% to 99.4%. One H7 virus isolated in 
China, A/duck/Guangdong/1/1996(H7N3), was grouped with bird-origin viruses from 
North America and was genetically closely related to A/ruddy turnstone/Delaware 
Bay/135/1996(H7N3), sharing a nucleotide sequence identity of 99.4%. 
 
119 
Table 10 Sequence identity of HA1 protein of H7 AIVs from distinct genetic clusters 
from North America. 
Genetic cluster 
% nucleotide/amino acid identity with viruses in genetic cluster 
I II III 
I 94.0/96.8 88.0/90.4 89.4/94.9 
II  96.1/95.7 89.5/92.0 
III   95.6/98.0 
 
Three major genetic clusters were identified in the North American lineage. 
Cluster I comprised the viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds during the 1970s 
into the early 1990s. From the available data, a clear temporal division was observed 
around 1994: cluster II mainly comprised the domestic poultry-origin H7 viruses isolated 
during1994–2006, and cluster III comprised the viruses recovered from wild and 
domestic birds after 1993. The tree topology was supported by the sequence identities: 
the average shared identities between HA1 nucleotide sequences within these clusters 
were 94.0% (cluster I), 96.1% (cluster II), and 95.6% (cluster III), and the average 
identities between viruses from one cluster and another were 88.0% (clusters I and II), 
89.5% (clusters II and III), and 89.4% (clusters I and III) (Table 10). 
Cluster I was estimated to emerge around 1969 (Table 12), and it circulated in 
North America for 24 years before its extinction in 1993. This cluster included one 
isolate recovered from a seal in 1980. Subtype H7N2 was the predominant subtype in 
cluster II, and the H7N2 viruses were mainly isolated from the LPM system in the 
northeastern United States and from commercial poultry farms in four US states 
(Maryland, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Virginia). Cluster II was further divided 
into two clades: II-1 and II-2. Clade II-1 mainly consisted of viruses isolated during 
1994-1996, and clade II-2 consisted of viruses isolated during 1996-2006. A clear 
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molecular difference separated these two clades: a deletion of eight amino acids at 
positions 212–219 in the HA1 protein. Cluster II included A/New York/107/2003(H7N2), 
which infected a human with suspected exposure to poultry (202). A similar 8-amino acid 
deletion was also observed in the HA1 protein of this virus. 
Cluster III represents the contemporary genetic pool of H7 AIVs in North 
America, including viruses from wild birds and from outbreaks among domestic poultry. 
H7 viruses isolated during individual outbreaks among domestic poultry formed 
independent monophyletic clades in the phylogeny, suggesting that they originated from 
separate introductions from wild birds (194). Three of the H7 viruses evolved into HPAI 
viruses: A/chicken/Canada/314514-2/2005(H7N3), A/chicken/SK/HR-
00011/2007(H7N3), and A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA1/2012(H7N3). Another H7 introduction, 
A/chicken/Delaware/10851/2014(H7N7), did not evolve into an HPAI virus. 
Limited Antigenic Diversity among Tested H7 AIVs 
Serologic analyses showed that the antisera generated against 15 selected isolates 
cross-reacted with the tested H7 isolates to different extents (Table 11, Table 13). 
Antigenic cartography showed no clear division of these isolates (Figure 23). The 
average antigenic distance among these isolates was 1.14 units (SD, 0.57 unit), and each 
unit represented a 2-fold change in HI titer. The hierarchical clustering method grouped 
these viruses into one cluster at a distance of 1.46 units, except for one outlier, 
A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000(H7N3). The average distance from the outlier to the 
remaining isolates was 2.01 units. Viruses from three distinct genetic clusters were 
grouped in this antigenic cluster; no clear correlation between the genetic diversity and 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Viruses isolated from wild and domestic birds lacked antigenic diversity. The 
average antigenic distance among wild bird-origin isolates was 1.14 units (SD, 0.57 unit). 
With the exception of one outlier, A/laughing gull/NJ/2455/2000(H7N3), hierarchical 
clustering showed that these isolates merged into one cluster at a distance of 1.47 units. 
The average antigenic distance among seven poultry-origin isolates was 1.13 units (SD, 
0.71 unit). These viruses were grouped into one cluster, at a distance of 1.63 units, by the 
hierarchical clustering method. Poultry-origin isolates were antigenically similar to those 
from wild birds; the distance between poultry-origin isolates and the most antigenically 
similar wild bird-origin isolates was 0.18–0.86 units. 
Limited antigenic diversity was supported by the comparison of amino acid 
sequence of the 135 residues corresponding to those in the reported antibody binding 
sites in influenza HA protein. Results showed that the average shared identity among 





Figure 23 Comparison of genetic and antigenic evolution of H7 AIVs from North 
America. 
(A) Schematic phylogenetic tree of the HA1 nucleotide sequences of H7 AIVs. Boxes 
represent the three major genetic clusters; branches corresponding to viruses subjected to 
antigenic characterization are colored-coded as described in the key; the same color code 
is used in (B). The Eurasian lineage (EU) is represented by the large black triangle, and 
Am represents North American lineage. (B) Antigenic cartography constructed on the 





Genetic Evolution Dynamics of the HA Gene 
To evaluate the genetic evolution dynamics for the HA gene of H7 AIVs isolated 
from North America, we analyzed (in temporal order) the genetic distance from each 
virus to A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3), the oldest isolate in the phylogeny (Figure 24). 
The average evolutionary rate on the nucleotide level was determined by the slope of the 
linear regression line that fits the data. Viruses in cluster I demonstrated a gradual and 
stable increase of genetic distance to A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3). The regression line 
for cluster I had a slope of 0.0061 (adjusted R2 = 0.88; p < 2.20E-16). The lack of 
continuations from 1971 to 1976 was due to the limited sampling during that time period. 
Viruses in cluster II evolved at a faster rate than those in cluster III (0.0052 [adjusted R2 
= 0.82; p < 2.20E-16] vs. 0.00218 [adjusted R2 = 0.42; p < 2.20E-16], respectively). 
Cluster II was separated into two clades at the 1996 time point, and an elevated increase 
in genetic distance was identified at that time. To determine the fluctuation of 
evolutionary dynamics in cluster II, we independently analyzed viruses in two clades. 
Regression analysis showed that viruses in clade II-1 evolved faster than those in clade 
II-2 (0.008 [adjusted R2 = 0.59; p < 4.07E-9] vs. 0.0046 [adjusted R2 = 0.67; p <2 .20E-
16], respectively). Cluster III consisted of viruses isolated from wild birds and individual 
outbreaks among domestic poultry. To evaluate the evolutionary status for H7 AIVs in 
wild birds more precisely, we conducted additional analyses for wild bird-origin viruses 
in this cluster. The slope of the regression line was 0.0019 (adjusted R2 = 0.31; p < 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similar analyses were conducted at the amino acid level by characterizing the 
genetic distance by the number of amino acid substitutions (Figure 24). A consistent 
evolution trend was observed for cluster I, which showed an average of 0.63 amino acid 
substitutions per year (adjusted R2 = 0.70; p < 3.27E-14). Cluster II had an average 
change of 1.47 amino acids per year (adjusted R2 = 0.71; p < 2.20E-16). A dramatic 
increase in the number of amino acid substitutions was observed in 1996; this finding is 
consistent with the observed deletion of eight amino acids in the HA1 protein at the same 
time. However, viruses in clades II-1 and II-2 had a similar average rate of evolution. The 
slopes of regression lines for these two clades were 0.80 (adjusted R2 = 0.26; p < 
0.00044) and 0.78 (adjusted R2 = 0.46; p < 2.20E-16), respectively. The temporal 
fluctuation of amino acid substitutions for viruses in cluster III was not well fitted by the 
linear regression model. However, it was observed that the number of amino acid 
substitutions in viruses isolated from poultry and humans is larger than that in wild bird-
origin viruses. 
Rates of mean nucleotide substitution and the time to the most recent common 
ancestor were also estimated by using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo method 
(Table 12). The mean evolutionary rate for the cluster I was estimated as 5.11 × 10−3 
substitutions per site per year (sub/site/year) (95% HPD, 3.94–6.25 × 10−3). Cluster II 
evolved at a higher mean evolutionary rate (5.34 × 10−3 sub/site/year; 95% HPD, 4.68–
6.11 ×10−3) than cluster III (4.84 × 10−3 sub/site/year; 95% HPD, 4.34–5.31 × 10−3). For 
cluster II, the estimated evolutionary rate for a collection of viruses in clade II-2 
decreased to 4.90 × 10−3 sub/site/year (95% HPD, 4.19–5.67 × 10−3). This result 
suggested that cluster II experienced a higher evolutionary rate during 1994–1996 and a 
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lower evolutionary rate afterwards. For cluster III, the estimated evolutionary rate for a 
collection of wild bird-origin viruses was 4.60 × 10−3 sub/site/year (95% HPD, 4.10–5.11 
× 10−3), which is lower than that for the entire cluster III population. 
The corresponding analysis of antigenic evolution dynamics showed that 
antigenicity was relatively stable during 1971–2012 (Figure 24). No clear correspondence 
was observed between the genetic and antigenic evolution dynamics. Of the 93 
characterized viruses, 72 were isolated in 2008 and 2009; the antigenic distances between 
these viruses and A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3) ranged from 0.86 to 3.12 units. The 
antigenic distances between the other 21 isolates and A/turkey/Oregon/1971(H7N3) also 
fall into this range. 
Table 12 Estimated rates of nucleotide substitution and time to most recent common 
ancestor for H7 AIVs from distinct genetic clusters from North America. 
Genetic 
cluster Model 





Mean 95% HPDa ESSb Mean 95% HPD ESS 
I SRD06-UCL–Skylinec 5.11 3.94–6.25 347 
 
1969 1963–1970 289 
II SRD06-UCL–Skyline 5.34 4.68–6.11 693 
 
1993 1990–1993 406 
IId SRD06-UCL–Skyline 4.90 4.19–5.67 856 
 
1996 1995–1996 1070 
III SRD06-UCL–Skyline 4.84 4.34–5.31 389 
 
1992 1991–1992 780 
IIIe SRD06-UCL–Skyline 4.60 4.10–5.11 299 
 
1992 1990– 1992 693 
a HPD: highest probability density. 
b Effective sample size. 
c SRD06: HKY substitution model; UCL: uncorrelated lognormal molecular clock, 
Skyline Coalescent Bayesian Skyline tree model. 
d Includes only viruses isolated after 1996. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Natural Selection for HA Gene of H7 AIVs in North America 
The selection pressure for the HA gene was investigated independently for each 
of the three genetic clusters (Table 14). The mean dN/dS for cluster II (dN/dS  = 0.1875–
0.2154) was higher than that for cluster III (dN/dS  = 0.1232–0.1407). The HA gene of 
viruses in clade II-2 had a lower mean dN/dS (0.1821–0.2121) than the entire population 
in cluster II. This finding suggests that the purifying selection for cluster II was lower 
during 1994–1996 than afterwards. Wild bird-origin isolates in cluster III were 
considered separately, and the results showed that the mean dN/dS was lower than that for 
the entire population in cluster III. This finding suggests that the purifying selection 
pressure was greater for wild bird-origin viruses than for poultry-origin viruses. Overall, 
the HA gene of H7 AIVs circulating in North America is under strong purifying 
selection, although there is variation in selection pressure for distinct genetic clusters. 
Amino acid position 189 (H3 numbering; H7 numbering, 180) in the HA1 protein 
was found to be under positive selection for the wild bird-origin viruses in cluster III. The 
amino acid profile of this position for H7 AIVs from Eurasia and North America was 
analyzed. Viruses isolated from land-based poultry and waterfowl were considered 
separately (Table 15). For viruses in the North American lineage, position 189 was found 
to be highly polymorphic in genetic clusters I and III: three and five distinct amino acids 
were observed, respectively, and T was the major amino acid in both clusters. HA gene in 
cluster II showed a distinct and conserved profile for position 189; with only one 
exception, S was the predominant amino acid. Amino acid profiles were also analyzed for 
three H7 viruses isolated from humans in North America: A/NewYork/107/2003(H7N2), 
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which is from cluster II, and A/Mexico/InDRE7218/2012(H7N3) and 
A/Canada/rv504/2004(H7N3), which are from cluster III. Amino acid S was observed at 
position 189 in A/NewYork/107/2003(H7N2), and amino acid T was observed in the 
other two viruses. Amino acid S was not observed at position 189 of Eurasian lineage H7 
AIVs. 
Table 14 Selection pressure in HA1 protein of H7 AIVs from North America. 
Genetic cluster, model dN/dS Positively selected sites (probability) 
I  
  M1a 0.1048 
  M7 0.0999 
II  
  M1a 0.2154 
  M7 0.1875 
IIa  
  M1a 0.2121 
  M7 0.1821 
III  
  M1a 0.1407 
  M7 0.1232 
IIIb  
  M1a 0.1242 
  M8 0.1086 189c (99.7%) 
a Include only viruses isolated after 1996. 
b Include only viruses isolated from waterfowl. 
c H3 numbering. 
Table 15 Amino acid polymorphism at position 189 (H3 numbering) in HA1 protein 
for H7 AIVs from North America and Eurasia. 
Genetic group Species No. of 
sequences 
Relevant amino acids No. of corresponding amino acids 
NA Ia Lb 16 T 16 
W 32 A/N/T 5/4/23 
NA II L 221 I/S 1/220 
W 15 S 15 
NA III L 39 A/N/T 1/6/32 
W 351 A/D/I/N/T 11/48/1/20/271 
NA human isolates He 3 S/T 1/2 
EAc L/W 1,118 A/G/N/T 670/1/1/446 
a Genetic cluster I in North American lineage. 
b L, land-based poultry; W, waterfowl; H, human. 
c Eurasian lineage. 
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Frequent Reassortment of Internal Genes of H7 AIVs in NA-WB Lineage 
Panoramic phylogenetic analyses of all H7 complete genomes showed a clear 
division of the two major lineages (North American and Eurasian) for each gene segment 
(Figure 25). It is noteworthy that the topology of the NS gene segment phylogeny showed 
a deep divergence between the A and B alleles: within each allele, virus isolated from 
North America and Eurasia was separated. Phylogenetic analysis of internal genes in the 
NA-WB lineage demonstrated a high level of heterogeneity (Figure 26). Multiple distinct 
clades could be identified for each gene segment. The largest number of clades was 
observed in the PB2 phylogeny, which had 14 clades. Phylogeny of PB1, PA, and NP 
gene segments could be separated into 12 clades. Less genetic diversity was observed for 
the matrix protein and NS gene segments, which had three and two distinct clades, 
respectively. 
The frequencies and patterns of reassortment of the six internal gene segments 
were assessed by determining the congruence among each gene’s phylogenetic tree. 
Results showed that the topologies of the internal gene trees were more similar to each 
other than to random phylogenetic trees (Figure 27), suggesting that the internal gene 
segments are not completely independent from each other. However, the dissimilarities in 
tree topology were extensive. The most significant incongruence was observed between 
NS and other gene segments; the NS gene tree was found to be closer in topology to 
random trees rather than to the other five internal gene trees. These results indicate 
frequent reassortment of the internal genes for H7 AIVs in lineage NA-WB; no clear link 
among specific gene segments was observed. 
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We assigned genotypes to viruses in the NA-WB lineage and analyzed the 
dynamics of these genotypes. Because 91% of the viruses were isolated during 2001–
2013, our analysis was constrained to viruses from this time period. H7 AIVs in the NA-
WB lineage demonstrated diverse genotypes: we identified 104 distinct genotypes for the 
internal gene constellation (Figure 28). Multiple genotypes were observed in the same 
year, and the largest number of genotype (29) was observed in 2009. Internal gene 
constellations were transient rather than stable, and no individual genotype existed 
throughout 2001–2013. A total of 92 genotypes existed for only one year, and two 





Figure 25 Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for internal gene segments of H7 
AIVs from Eurasian and North American lineage. 
Black bars on the lower right indicate two alleles in the NS gene segment phylogenetic 
tree. Bootstrap values estimated from 100 resamplings of the sequence data are shown 




Figure 26 Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees for internal gene segments of H7 
AIVs derived from wild birds in North America. 




Figure 27 Congruence in topology among six internal gene segment phylogenetic trees 
for H7 AIVs derived from wild birds in North America. 
Each column represents the difference in log likelihood value when six internal gene 
phylogenies and 100 random phylogenies were fitted to the same dataset. The difference 
in log likelihood value for each gene phylogeny is indicated by a colored dot. Range for 




Figure 28 Year-by-year analysis of the evolution dynamics of internal gene 
constellations for H7 AIVs derived from wild birds in North America during 
2001–2013. 
Small black dots indicate gene constellations that existed for only one year. Larger 
colored dots indicate gene constellations that were observed in multiple years; the span of 
years is indicated by a dashed line between the dots, and colors indicate the number of 




We genetically and antigenically characterized 93 H7 AIVs isolated from North 
America. Our results show that H7 AIVs in North America have wide genetic diversity. 
Gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions is observed for the HA 
gene of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds. Our results also show a limited 
antigenic diversity among the H7 viruses we tested. 
In wild birds, the limited antigenic diversity for H7 AIVs is consistent with the 
concept of evolutionary stasis (248). These results are consistent with those from other 
studies of wild bird-origin H7 viruses in other regions. For example, a 2005 study showed 
that four H7 AIVs isolated from mallards in Sweden and the Netherlands in 2000 and 
2002 had relatively conserved antigenic properties (249). In addition, antigenic 
differences between these mallard-derived H7 isolates and an HPAI H7N7 strain isolated 
in the Netherlands in 2003 were within a 4-fold change. No significant antigenic 
differences (i.e., within a 4-fold change) were observed for nine H7 AIVs isolated in Italy 
and China during 1999–2005 (196); of the nine isolates, four were H7N7 viruses derived 
from ducks in China in 2003, three were H7 isolates derived from mallards in Italy during 
2001–2005, and two were H7 viruses derived from turkeys in Italy in 1999 and 2002. 
Our molecular characterization results suggest that the genetic evolution pattern in 
the isolates we tested is gradual and stable. The estimated mean rate of evolution for the 
H7 gene of AIVs circulating among wild birds in North America is 4.60 × 10−3 
sub/site/year, which is similar to the rate for Eurasian lineage H7 viruses (5.75 × 10−3 
sub/site/year) (234). Selection analysis showed that the H7 gene is under strong purifying 
selection in wild birds; however, no amino acids at known antibody binding sites were 
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under positive selection. The limited antigenic diversity among the H7 isolates might be 
associated with the absence of certain pattern recognition receptors in the immune 
response system of wild birds. These receptors are triggered by influenza virus and could 
initiate the activation of innate immune responses. A 2010 study (250) showed that the 
presence of the retinoic acid–inducible gene 1 (RIG-I) in ducks induces the production of  
IFN-β and expression of downstream IFN-stimulated antiviral genes; however, the 
absence of RIG-I in chickens contributes to their increased susceptibility (compared with 
that of ducks) to influenza virus. In addition, Toll-like receptors (TLR) induce the 
expression of type I IFN and proinfammatory cytokines (251). TLRs 3,7,8, and 9 
upregulate in naturally occurring influenza, and they are associated with innate virus 
inhibitory and proinflammatory responses (252). TLRs in birds differ from those in 
mammals. Furthermore,  TLR9 is absent in avian species, and many TLRs in wild birds 
have yet to be identified (253). 
Vaccination is a key component of the control strategy for HPAI viruses. 
However, antigenic variations in AIVs from domestic poultry have been reported, and 
these variations seem to be caused by the use of vaccine in poultry flocks. In 2002, 
poultry flocks across Italy were vaccinated to prevent an outbreak of H7N3 virus; the 
vaccine contained an inactivated H7N1 AIV (i.e., a vaccine with the same HA subtype as 
the outbreak virus but with an antigenically and genetically different NA subtype). 
Antigenic characterization of a longitudinal collection of 41 isolates showed large 
antigenic difference between viruses isolated before and after implementation of the 
vaccination program (169). Antigenic change was mirrored by the simultaneous 
appearance of four amino acid substitutions within the antibody binding sites, and one 
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amino acid was positively selected after the use of vaccine. In addition, the poultry 
vaccination program in Mexico has facilitated the antigenic evolution of HPAI H5N2 
virus in that country. An outbreak of HPAI H5N2 virus was detected in 1994 in Mexico, 
and a vaccination program, using inactivated vaccine, was implemented in 1995. 
Phylogenetic analysis of 52 H5N2 viruses isolated during 1993–2002 showed that two 
genetically different sub-lineages had emerged after introduction of the vaccine program 
and replaced the early sub-lineages (168). Viruses in these two new sub-lineages had 
undergone antigenic drift and acquired a more than 4-fold antigenic change from the 
vaccine strain. Six amino acid substitutions located within antibody sites A, B, and C 
were detected for these two novel sub-lineages. Similar changes were observed for the 
emergence of an H5N1 influenza variant in China. Since September 2005, routine 
vaccination programs against H5N1 virus in domestic poultry have been conducted 
nationwide in China. However, results of serologic testing of serum samples from 1,113 
chickens in Guangdong and Guizhou, China, suggested that among the vaccinated 
poultry, protection against an FJ-like H5N1 variant was poor compared with that against 
other co-circulating H5N1 viruses (254). The presence of vaccine pressure probably 
selected the FJ-like H5N1 viruses, and these viruses became predominant in the region. 
The change of antigenicity in these outbreaks was mirrored by the observed fast 
rate of evolution. The H7N3 AIVs from the Italian epidemic were estimated to evolve at 
a mean rate of 8.04 × 10 × 10−3 sub/site/year, whereas the evolutionary rates for two 
emerging H5N2 sub-lineages in Mexico were estimated to be 12 × 10−3 and 10 × 10−3 
sub/site/year, respectively. These evolutionary rates are significantly higher than those 
reported for H7 and H5 viruses from domestic poultry in the absence of vaccine program, 
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as exemplified by the range of evolutionary rates for H5N1 viruses isolated from 
Thailand, Turkey, and Nigeria: 2.5 × 10−3 to 5.2 × 10−3 sub/site/year (166). The findings 
from these studies (166, 168, 169, 254) suggest that the presence of vaccine pressure may 
drive antigenic drift of AIVs in domestic poultry. In our study, antigenic cartography 
showed that the average antigenic distance among seven poultry-origin H7 isolates was 
1.13 units (SD, 0.71 unit). The limited antigenic diversity may be attributable to the 
absence of large-scale vaccination programs against H7 AIVs in North America, with the 
exception of Mexico. The estimated mean evolution rate for the H7 gene of AIVs from 
domestic poultry in the United States was 5.34 × 10−3 sub/site/year. This rate is 
significantly lower than that found in the presence of a vaccination program but similar to 
that found in the absence of vaccine program. 
Adaptations are required when IAVs are transmitted across species, including 
from waterfowl to land-based birds (e.g., chickens and turkeys) (9). HA protein plays an 
important role in host-cell recognition, and mutation in HA protein has been identified as 
a major determinant of host shift to domestic poultry. Previous research identified two 
amino acid substitutions in the HA1 protein for H7 AIVs after their introduction from 
wild birds to domestic poultry (150). Furthermore, a 1997 study showed that evolution of 
the HA gene could increase significantly after introduction into domestic poultry; the 
evolution rate for the HA gene of H5 AIVs increased significantly after introduction into 
domestic poultry in Mexico (255). Our results showed the same trend for the H7 gene of 
AIVs from North America: the HA gene of poultry-origin H7 AIVs evolves faster than 
that of waterfowl-origin viruses. Moreover, results showed that the evolution rate for the 
H7 gene was faster during 1994–1996 than in subsequent years. The rapid evolution 
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during 1994–1996 was mirrored by an 8–amino acid deletion in 1996 at positions 212–
219 in the HA1 protein. This deletion removes five of six consecutive amino acids in part 
of the receptor binding site. These findings suggest that the H7 gene underwent rapid 
adaptation in the receptor binding domain after introduction into domestic poultry. 
Of interest, position 189 (H3 numbering; H7 numbering, 180) in the HA1 protein 
was identified as being under positive selection pressure, and this site is located in the 
receptor binding site for H7 IAVs (256). Extensive polymorphisms, representing six 
distinct amino acids (A, D, I, N, S, and T), are present at position 189. A previous study 
showed that propagation of human H1N1 influenza virus in embryonated chicken eggs 
could cause the substitution E189K at the HA1 protein (257). R189K was found to have 
contributed to the antigenic drift of H3N2 IAV (258), and position 189 plays an 
important role for the antigenicity of H3 equine influenza virus (259). Another study 
showed that single amino acid changes at position A186D (H3 numbering, 189) could 
increase yield of A/California/7/09(H1N1) virus in eggs (260). Most influenza viruses 
recovered from avian samples have been propagated by using chicken embryonated eggs, 
and a previous study demonstrated frequent adaptation of H1N1 waterfowl-origin AIVs 
during propagation in embryonated eggs (261). The receptors in chicken embryonated 
eggs and those in the mallard gastrointestinal track are not exactly the same. In addition, 
expression of sialic acids showed substantial host-specific distinctions among avian 
species. Expression of α2,3-linked sialic acids and α2,6-linked sialic acids were observed 
in chicken trachea, whereas α2,3-linked sialic acids were predominant in ducks (262, 
263). Thus, it is possible that the polymorphisms and positive selection detected in 
position 189 in the HA1 protein were due to viral propagation in embryonated eggs. 
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Our phylogenetic analysis identified the 2-way intercontinental flow of the AIV 
H7 gene through the migration of wild birds. At least two independent introductions (in 
1992 and 1994) from the Eurasian genetic pool to the North American genetic pool were 
identified. These introductions were not observed in earlier studies with smaller datasets 
(264, 265). Early research detected a subtype H6 IAV in the United States with an HA 
gene derived from the Eurasian gene pool; the virus subsequently caused an outbreak 
among poultry in California during 2000–2002 (50). The introduced Eurasian H6 virus 
has led to the replacement of the endemic H6 AIVs in North America. Recently, 
outbreaks of novel HPAI H5 viruses have been detected in the United States and Canada. 
These viruses originated from a wholly Eurasia-origin H5N8 virus introduced to North 
America by migratory birds through Beringia in 2014 (266). Two novel reassortants 
(H5N2 and H5N1) were generated by reassortments with viruses circulating in North 
America. The Beringian Crucible, including Alaska and the Russian Far East, serves as a 
common breeding area for diverse bird species from Asia and North America. This area 
provides an ideal environment for reassortment between IAVs carried by migratory birds 
from distinct gene pools, and it allows for the intercontinental transfer of gene segments 
or whole virus. Gene flow increases the diversity in individual genetic pools, and 
diversity could enhance the risk of generating novel strains that can spread more 
efficiently among birds and even cross the species barrier and cause transmission to 
mammals. 
Our evolutionary analysis revealed frequent reassortment of six internal gene 
segments of H7 AIVs in the NA-WB lineage; no clear link was identified for any specific 
gene segment. The internal gene constellation was diverse and transient. This finding was 
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concordant with those from a 2008 study conducted with a smaller dataset of AIVs and 
without differentiating the HA subtype (48). However, our finding of a diverse and 
transient gene constellation differed from the finding of a limited number of stable 
internal gene cassettes for IAVs adapted to mammals. The eight gene segments of IAVs 
could evolve differently due to different selection pressures. The evolution of the internal 
gene segments may be determined by functional constraints rather than immune pressure 
for the genes coded for the two surface proteins. In wild birds, internal protein genes are 
highly conserved on the amino acid level, and they could form a large pool of 
functionally equivalent gene segments. Such a pool would allow frequent reassortment 
because the exchange of functionally equivalent gene segments is not likely to attenuate 
the relative fitness of the reassorted viruses. For mammalian adapted IAVs, certain 
internal gene constellations were suggested to confer a selective advantage to the virus 
(227). Mutations may be acquired for internal genes after adaptation to a new host, and 
those mutations would separate the viruses from those in the natural reservoir. The 
protein–protein interaction could force the co-evolution of these gene segments and 
maintain the existence of a specific internal gene constellation. 
In summary, our findings demonstrate a limited antigenic diversity among 
contemporary H7 avian-origin IAVs from North America. H7 IAVs from wild birds, 
domestic poultry, and a seal, which together represent a diverse geographic and temporal 
coverage, were included in this study. The limitation of this study was the small number 
of H7N3 isolates from the ongoing AIV outbreak in Mexico. Additional studies on a 
longitudinal collection of H7N3 viruses from the outbreak in Mexico would add to our 
understanding of the influence vaccination programs have on genetic and antigenic 
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evolutionary dynamics. LPAI H7N9 viruses are enzootic in China (234), but the antigenic 
properties of these viruses have not been characterized. An antigenic comparison of H7 
AIVs from the United State and those from outbreaks in other regions, including China 
and Europe, is also lacking. Due to the possible transmission of H7 AIVs across regions 






The emergence of novel avian origin IAVs presents a continuous threat to animal 
and public health. The objectives of this dissertation research are to infer the genesis of 
two emerging avian origin IAVs, LPAI H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses, and to 
investigate the antigenic diversity and genetic evolution of H7 AIVs isolated from North 
America over the past 40 years. The findings and contributions are concluded as 
following. 
First, a gradual increase in IAV prevalence and detection of H10 viruses was 
observed in the LPM visited by the first patient infected with the novel H10N8 virus. 
AIVs that are genetically close to the human H10N8 isolate were recovered from this 
LPM. High seroprevalence of H10 virus was observed in chickens and ducks from five 
LPMs in the city. These findings suggested that LPM is the most probable source of 
human infection with this novel H10N8 virus, and this virus appears to present 
throughout the LPM system in the city. These findings also highlight the role of LPMs in 
the zoonotic transmission of AIVs and suggest that the existing influenza ecosystem in 
Southern China could favor the emergence of novel IAVs that present potential risk to 
animal and human health. 
Second, the novel H7N8 virus most likely circulated among diving ducks in the 
Mississippi flyway during autumn 2015 and was subsequently introduced to Indiana 
 
148 
turkey, in which it evolved from LPAI into HPAI. H4N8 IAVs circulating among diving 
duck possess a gene constellation comprising five H7N8–like gene segments (except PA, 
HA, and NP, >98% sequence identity). Preceding the outbreak, an isolate with six gene 
segments (except NP and MP) sharing >99% sequence identity with those of H7N8 
turkey viruses was recovered from a diving duck. These findings suggest that viral gene 
constellations circulating among diving ducks could contribute towards the emergence of 
IAVs that can affect domestic poultry, and diving ducks may serve as the potentially 
unique IAV reservoir or uniquely contribute to the maintenance, diversification, and 
transmission of IAVs in wild birds. These findings also highlight the importance of 
genomic sequencing and gene constellation characterization in wild bird IAV 
surveillance. 
Third, a gradual accumulation of nucleotide and amino acid substitutions in the 
HA gene of H7 AIVs isolated from wild and domestic birds in North America has led to 
wide genetic diversity. Limited antigenic diversity was observed among the 93 North 
American contemporary H7 AIVs we tested. These findings suggested that continuous 
genetic evolution has not led to significant antigenic diversity for contemporary H7 AIVs 
from North America. 
In summary, this dissertation study addresses the immediate public and animal 
health problem presented by the emergence of two novel avian origin IAVs, LPAI 
H10N8 and HPAI H7N8 viruses. In addition, it investigates the long-term antigenic and 
genetic evolution of H7 AIVs from North America over the past 40 years. The findings in 
this dissertation add to our knowledge of the natural history of IAVs and are critical for 
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